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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of South Africa mandates that its Supreme Court use
international law to determine the substantive meaning of its own Bill of
Rights.1 The Constitution of the United States does no such thing.
Nevertheless, from time to time, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken it upon
itself to use international law as persuasive authority to interpret various
provisions of the U.S. Constitution.2 Indeed, the Court has done so in very high
profile cases such as Lawrence v. Texas,3 where the Court struck down a Texas
anti-sodomy statute as an unconstitutional violation of due process;4 Roper v.
Simmons,5 where the Court stated that capital punishment could not be
constitutionally applied to those who had committed crimes under the age of
eighteen;6 and most recently, Graham v. Florida,7 where the Court ruled that
sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for
a non-murder crime was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.8
The high visibility of the cases in which the Court has called upon
international law to determine the proper meaning of certain domestic
constitutional provisions has brought a lot of attention to this practice. Indeed,
this issue has stirred up a lot of academic emotions (such as they are) as well as
engendered a passionate response from Congress. It is the lack of a specific
interpretative mandate in the U.S. Constitution that has functioned as the
springboard for much of the commentary, mostly critical, from the legislative
branch of government and academia alike. Much of this criticism boils down to
a simple exhortation to abandon this practice altogether because its use
supposedly undermines democracy and the sovereignty of the United States.9

1 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 39(1)(b). The South African constitution also contains a provision suggesting
(but not mandating) that foreign law be consulted in similar circumstances. Id. § 39(1)(c).
2 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie D. Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743
(2005) (describing the long history of uses of non-U.S. law in the United States).
3 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4 See id.
5 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
6 See id.
7 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
8 See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
9 See Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and
Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 69 (2004). Other commentators have argued that the concept of “sovereignty”
is “rooted in mistake.” LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8 (1995) [hereinafter
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW]. Henkin goes further to note that “sovereignty . . . is often a catchword, a

GLENSY GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 9:54 AM

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

199

However, this proposed abandonment appears unlikely to happen as it seems
that for the foreseeable future the U.S. Supreme Court will be composed of a
majority of justices who, in some way or other, favor this practice.
Nevertheless, on a specific point, those who criticize the consultation of
international law in cases dealing with the interpretative complexities of the
U.S. Constitution make a valid argument: the way in which the U.S. Supreme
Court pursues this endeavor is seemingly ad hoc and therefore lacks coherence,
method, and context.10
This Article seeks to address this latter category of criticisms and proposes
a method for the selection of international law within the framework of U.S.
domestic constitutional interpretation. Only a methodological consistency that
springs forth from a reasonable theoretical background can begin to quell the
anxieties of those who see this form of constitutional interpretative practice as
a somewhat veiled (if not overt) threat to the foundations of the Republic.11
Most importantly, a sound methodological approach to this contemporary
practice of constitutional reasoning serves one of the most important goals of
judicial rulemaking within a democratic framework: plausible predictability. If
the accusations of haphazardness and self-interest that accompany the Court’s
persuasive use of international law as a tool of constitutional interpretation can
be set aside via adoption of a cohesive technique, then surely the whole
enterprise would be perceived as standing on much firmer ground even by the
critics.
Within this context, it is important to differentiate between international
law and foreign domestic law. Both of these sources can provide a valuable
repository of authority for U.S. courts to consult when formulating a particular
doctrine of domestic constitutional law. Indeed, courts regularly utilize both of
these sources in this way.12 However, the separate scopes, underlying policies,
and processes of enactment of each of these bodies of law often are
considerably different one from the other. Therefore, it makes sense to
distinguish them when contextualizing their respective uses within this

substitute for thinking and precision,” and that “[f]or legal purposes at least, we might do well to relegate the
term sovereignty to the shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era.” Id. at 8, 10.
10 See Ramsey, supra note 9.
11 This sort of hyperbolic phraseology was indeed used by those seeking to discredit the practice. See
Donald E. Childress III, Note, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions,
53 DUKE L.J. 193, 197 (2003).
12 See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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framework of constitutional law.13 Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court has
so far failed to make this distinction. This has provided yet another reason for
the critics to attack (in this case, most fairly) the whole interpretative
enterprise.
The issue of how and when international law should be utilized as
persuasive authority within the context of U.S. constitutional reasoning is one
of great import and almost equally great complexity. Comparative uses of
different bodies of law have grown exponentially over the last twenty years as
the world has become more globalized—this trend so far shows no signs of
abating. However, the myriad possible combinations within different systems
of law have left this enterprise fragmented, disorderly, and without a systemic
centricity. Some have suggested that this reflects the reality of the practice and
that no further intrastate and interstate coordination can be expected.14 Others,
however, have begun the long and arduous course of giving this comparative
enterprise a theoretical and operational contour in the hope of increasing its use
and furthering its success.15
It is from this latter vantage point that this Article arises. Part I offers a
brief bird’s-eye view of the possible array of sources of international law that
exist to which the constitutional interpreters can refer. In doing so, this Part
points out the various subtleties that exist in international lawmaking and the
effect that the various rulemaking processes that exist within this framework
have on the reach and applicability of the promulgated rules. Part II addresses
the goals of the comparative enterprise so that the use of international law can
be better related to the context in which it is being employed. Part III
undertakes a brief overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent use of
international law as persuasive authority in constitutional interpretation. This
Part illustrates the firm factual grounding that critics of the practice are on
when they note the apparent lack of methodological consistency that exists in

13 A pair of previous articles addressed the propriety of distinguishing between international law and
foreign domestic law as sources of persuasive authority for U.S. constitutional interpretation and proposed a
methodology for conducting this process with respect to foreign domestic law. See Rex D. Glensy,
Constitutional Interpretation Through a Global Lens, 75 MO. L. REV. 1171 (2010) [hereinafter Glensy,
Constitutional Interpretation]; Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count? Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection
of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357 (2005) [hereinafter Glensy, Which Countries Count?].
14 See, e.g., Roger Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L
L. 57 (2004); Richard A. Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004,
at 40. As is customary, the word “state” in the context of international law refers to a nation.
15 See Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk with You, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 46; Mark
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999).
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the Court’s decisions when it comes to the comparative deployment of
international law.
Part IV then addresses the concerns of those critics. By drawing on the
policy foundations illustrated in Part II and the recent experience of the Court
described in Part III, Part IV proposes a structure for the use of international
law in this context. This framework consists of the balancing of three factors
that the Court should take into account when utilizing international law: (1) the
international dimension and ramifications of the case at hand; (2) the nature of
the international norms that the Court is seeking to import; and lastly (3) the
stated position of the United States, if any, regarding the specific international
rule being consulted. Only by taking these factors into account can the process
be properly contextualized and thus mature into a developed and mostly
predictable endeavor that will go a long way toward immunizing it from the
attacks of the critics.
It is fundamental to address what this Article is not suggesting: that
international law in any way, shape, or form should function as binding
authority in a case revolving around the interpretation of a specific U.S.
constitutional provision. In fact, Justice Kennedy recently stated that his use of
international law in an Eighth Amendment case “does not control [the]
decision.”16 In other words, the bandying about of the horror scenario where
the General Assembly of the United Nations (“UN”) or the International Court
of Justice promulgates resolutions or issues decisions that are binding upon the
United States on matters of domestic constitutional law is nothing but a
rhetorical ruse designed to deflect from the real issues regarding the use of
international law.17 Therefore, all of the issues discussed in this Article are to
be solely construed and applied to the context of international law being used
as persuasive—in other words, non-binding—authority within the framework
of U.S. constitutional decisionmaking and nothing else.

16

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.
See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 199–201 (2005) (“If we’re relying on a
decision from a German judge about what our Constitution means, no President accountable to the people
appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that judge, and yet he’s playing a role
in shaping a law that binds the people in this country.”).
17

GLENSY GALLEYSFINAL

202

6/28/2011 9:54 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

I. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY
The pantheon of sources of authority that could come under the rubric of
international law is expanding rapidly whether one wants to adopt a rigid or a
looser definition of the term. Thus, before constructing a theory and
methodology upon which the U.S. Supreme Court can rely when consulting
international law within the context of domestic constitutional reasoning, a
reasonably defined universe of possible sources of international authority
should be constructed so that the possible scope of the practice is not infinite.
A lot has been written on what should be considered international law, what
effect it should have on nations and their populations, as well as how it should
be enforced. This Article does not purport to enter into those debates that are
largely about the process and substance of international law as binding
authority. Because the topic of this Article is about a process for the usage of
international law as persuasive authority, the illustrative scope of the range of
international law functions simply as a presentation of the repository of law
from which it would be legitimate for the U.S. Supreme Court to draw.
A. International Law
International law is often considered somewhat of a mystery by those in the
legal world who are not accustomed to its substantive rules and practices. A
possible reason for this is that its systems of promulgation, recognition, and
execution do not closely resemble their equivalent counterparts in domestic
law and appear unfamiliar to the outside observer. Probably the most
perplexing aspect of international law is that, by and large, it does not bind a
nation-state unless this state has by action or inaction consented to its
application.18 Thus, for example, in domestic law, a speed limit on the freeway
applies to all drivers whether they consent to be bound by it or not; but in
international law, compensation rules for improper expropriation of assets do
not apply to the expropriating country unless it has agreed to be bound by such
rules.
Equally confounding to those who question the legal status of international
rules is the notion that, by definition, international law erodes national
sovereignty by limiting the decisional power of a domestic regime within its

18 HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 27. This aspect gave rise to the now-famous adage that
“almost all nations observe . . . almost all of their [international] obligations almost all of the time.” LOUIS
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (1979) [hereinafter HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE].
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own territory.19 Similarly, unlike domestic law, even if a nation has consented
to be bound by a particular rule of international law, there appear to be no
conventional ways of enforcing compliance with those rules should that nation
ignore its undertaken obligations. All of these issues have generated
considerable debate among scholars about the nature and place of international
law within the repository of all law,20 but such debates, while fascinating and
important, do not actually shed much light on the proper methodology to
employ in using international law as persuasive authority for U.S.
constitutional interpretation.21
It is more relevant to simply set out what the possible sources of
international law could be under the pertinent rules of recognition dictated by
international law itself. Fortunately, on this point, there is considerably more
agreement.22 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”),23 which is the implementing statute of the ICJ (the UN’s highest
judicial entity), provides the following guidance:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a.

international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

b.

international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;

c.

the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d.

. . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
24
for the determination of rules of law.

The above statute makes it clear that international conventions (treaties)
and customary law are the first two sources of international law upon which
the ICJ relies upon to reach its rulings. Against this foreground, the statute also

19

HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 18, at 29–30.
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 63–64.
21 The particular status of a specific substantive law under international rules is nonetheless a crucial
factor in determining whether and how it ought to be employed in the context of constitutional reasoning. See
infra Part IV.B.2.
22 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 13 (2d ed. 2006).
23 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
24 Id.
20
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exhorts the import of “general principles of law” (background norms)25 and
suggests some methods for gleaning where the law might lie.26 Even though
these two areas of law still function as the primary sources for the formation of
international law, the repeated interaction of quasi-governmental entities such
as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
multinational enterprises27 has given rise to a third source of law that has
quickly emerged as an important player in the international law field: so-called
soft law.28 The range of these three sources is detailed below.
1. Treaties
Treaties are probably the preferred contemporary way of making
international law. Although part of most anciens régimes, this form of
delineating international rules and duties has survived and flourished in the
modern era. The reasons for the continued (and increasing) popularity of
treaties in today’s world are plentiful. First, the substantive rules of treaties,
although open to the usual interpretative variables, are relatively easy to
determine (especially compared with the other two sources of international
law). Second, the problem of state consent identified above is largely mitigated
by treaties because they are usually entered into through a recognizable
affirmative act by the nation entering into them (this being an executive
signature, a parliamentary statute, or a combination thereof). Third, treaties
resemble in form and sometimes in substance, the controlling documents that
pertain to domestic governance. Finally, treaties are more familiar to a
domestic constituency and therefore might be more favored and accepted by
such constituency.29
Treaties come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes—they also can cover
every possible relationship and subject matter. Therefore, treaties can be
bilateral (between two countries), multilateral (between numerous countries),

25 Doctrines such as res judicata and collateral estoppel, which originate within the ambit of domestic
law, are often borrowed to resolve international law disputes and are thus examples of those “general
principles” adduced by Article 38.
26 BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 13.
27 Naturally, all of these players and others in the international law realm make diverse and often
discordant claims of what constitutes “law,” who is rightfully applying it, and who is violating it. These claims
only affect tangentially the analysis proposed herein and such effects are discussed in Part IV.
28 C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989).
29 See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS 36 (2d ed. 2006).
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and regional (covering only countries of a certain geographic area).30
Furthermore, subject matters can range from broad scopes such as constitutive
documents (for example, the UN Charter31 and the Treaty establishing the
European Union32) and global agreements purporting to regulate the
environment and human rights,33 to more narrowly tailored instruments that
resolve the claims of warring nations or regulate trading deals between
economic partners.34 Needless to say, the sheer array of possibilities regarding
treaties, coupled with their increasing popularity, has resulted in their
proliferation so much so that the United Nations Treaty Series—the catalogue
of all treaties deposited with the UN Secretary-General—contains several tens
of thousands of operative examples.35
For the judge attempting to use international law as an aid to interpret the
U.S. Constitution, identifying whether relevant law is contained in a treaty is
not a complicated matter. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
defines a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law.”36 That leaves extreme leeway
for the rules of recognition pertaining to treaties, even though the Vienna
Convention does narrow the scope of state behavior pertaining to treaties by
noting that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.”37 Thus, treaties represent a mostly reliable
indicator of the content of international law. The most notable exception to this
is when a treaty is deemed to conflict with a peremptory norm of international
law (jus cogens), the result of which conflict results in the invalidation of the
treaty.38 However, because there are only a few peremptory norms (such as the

30

See infra Part I.B.
U.N. Charter.
32 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C
115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
33 E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec.
10, 1948); BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 141 (discussing various multilateral environmental efforts including
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the 1985 Vienna Convention on the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, and the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change).
34 E.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 143 (discussing friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties);
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 18, at 77 (discussing the Korean Armistice Agreement).
35 United Nations Treaty Collection, UNTC, http://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1 (last
visited Apr. 2, 2011).
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, T.S. No. 58, 115 U.N.T.S. 331.
37 Id. art. 26.
38 Id. art. 53.
31
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prohibition of genocide, slavery, piracy, and torture),39 it is indeed rare for a
treaty to be voided for that reason, reinforcing the notion it is a safe to consult
treaties when seeking to ascertain the content of international law.
2. Customary Law
State practice dictates the contours and substance of customary
international law. As a result, customary international law “results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”40 In other words, over the course of time, the practices of countries
which repeatedly interact with one another will increasingly grow more
convergent until eventually they reach a level of basic uniformity that gives
rise to an implicit acknowledgement that such practice has to be followed out
of a sense of legal requirement.41 No formal agreement, treaty, or statement of
acquiescence is required for a rule of customary international law to rise to the
level of binding authority.42 However, a rule of customary international law
will not bind a nation that has objected to its substance while such rule was in
the process of formation.43 Further, failure to object is considered to be implicit
consent in the application of that rule and includes an assumption that the nonobjecting nations agree to be bound by it.44 There are a couple of exceptions to
the ability of states to object to a rule of customary international law. First,
nations that come into being after the formation of a customary rule, or for
another reason did not have an opportunity to object during that rule’s
formation, are precluded from exempting themselves from such a rule.45 The
only other exception to the ability to object to a rule of customary international
law was alluded to in the section above—that is the case of peremptory norms
(being a form of über-customary international law) that cannot be derogated by
any nation according to the dictates of international law.46
While the rules for the formation of customary international law are easy to
state, they are slightly less easy to implement, which has been the source of
39

There is wide disagreement as to when a rule of customary law matures into jus cogens. DUNOFF ET
supra note 29, at 59. Nevertheless, there is very little disagreement about the fact that the prohibitions
listed in the main text have achieved that status. Id. at 59, 946.
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987).
41 This sense of legal obligation is often referred to as opinio juris. BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 16–17.
42 Id. at 16.
43 Id. at 21.
44 Id. at 22.
45 Id. at 24.
46 Id.
AL.,
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much scholarly commentary. Generally, state practice can exhibit itself in
many different forms such as “diplomatic contacts and correspondence, public
statements of government officials, legislative and executive acts, military
manuals and actions by military commanders, treaties and executive
agreements, decisions of international and national courts and tribunals, and
decisions, declarations, and resolutions of international organizations, among
many others.”47 Most often, some passage of time is required for a practice to
ripen into customary law although the actual length of time is undefined and
can range from relatively short periods to a span of many years.48
Nevertheless, the key to a legal rule having the force of customary
international law is the notion that states believe they have to follow such a
rule out of a sense of legal obligation.
American courts are very accustomed to dealing with all aspects of
customary international law, including, and most relevant to the present
discussion, identifying what the rule is and deciding whether it has acquired
the status of customary law so that states feel legally obligated to follow it.
This process is exemplified in the famous case of The Paquete Habana49
where the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the
condemnation of two seized Spanish fishing boats as spoils of war was
synchronous with the then-current understandings of international law.50 In a
very detailed opinion, where the court examined the practices of many states
throughout an almost 600-year history, it invalidated the seizures as being
contrary to the “law of nations” and ordered the proceeds of the sale of such
boats restored to their owners.51 Today, such forays into the Jurassic period of
law are hardly necessary, as numerous contemporary sources of possible state
practice exist. Thus, the court wishing to call upon such sources of
international law as aids to constitutional interpretation is easily equipped with

47

DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 79.
BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 19. The International Law Association’s Committee on the Formation of
Customary (General) International Law issued in 2000 a Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation
of General Customary International Law, which illustrated how state sovereignty claims to continental shelves
adjacent to their territory matured from a unilateral claim by one state (the United States) that went
unchallenged by other nations, to other nations following suit, to, several years later, recognized international
law concerning a state’s jurisdiction over its proximate continental shelf. INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMM. ON
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT’L LAW, STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO GENERAL
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 20–21 (2000).
49 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 686–708.
48
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the factual and analytical tools necessary to successfully deploy such
resources.
3. Soft Law
Treaties and customary law have not always proven ideal in regulating a
whole series of modern international interactions. Some international
relationships are not suited to the formal and somewhat rigid treaty-making
and ratification process, nor are they very susceptible to the protracted ripening
of state practices that is necessary for the formation of customary law.52 Thus,
a third area of international rule-making has emerged that is generally
referenced under the moniker soft law.53 This can be defined as a quasi-legal
obligation that does not have binding force, but nevertheless is seen by players
in the international sphere as a useful guide in determining the range of
acceptable international conduct.54 Aside from official institutional bodies,
non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations or advocacy groups
that are playing an increasing and vital position in the administration of
international governance have a role in the creation of soft law.55
Examples of soft law that come from official institutional bodies are
instruments such as UN General Assembly Resolutions, statements from other
transnational bodies that are non-binding at inception, and decisions by
international administrative agencies.56
Other forms of soft law may include . . . joint communiqués and other
instruments expressing shared political commitments of particular
states, “gentlemen’s agreements” on the composition of international
bodies and tribunals, codes of conduct such as those proposed by the
apparel industry to regulate working conditions in foreign-owned
garment
factories,
interpretative
statements
regarding
treaties . . . programs of action for multilateral conferences,
guidelines and reports prepared by expert groups, and countless
57
others.

52
53
54
55
56
57

DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 93 (giving the example of foreign direct investment).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94.
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Like many things that pertain to international governance, the status of soft
law as law, quasi-law, or something else is debated vigorously.58 This debate is
somewhat secondary to the discussion in this Article because international law
in the context of constitutional interpretation is used as persuasive authority,
which is the same as the nature of soft law within the context of international
law. Thus, ab initio, the main point of relevance to the judge tasked with
looking at soft law within the context of international law is to be familiar with
its rules of recognition. Once those have been successfully dealt with, the force
or import of soft law will become a factor to be weighed among others in
deciding whether it should be deployed as persuasive authority to help interpret
the U.S. Constitution.59
B. The Regional Law Dilemma
The lawmaking activities of regional organizations are playing an
increasing role in international governance. For the purposes of this Article it
becomes paramount to assess whether the law generated by the institutional
bodies of these sorts of governing entities forms part of the “international law”
equation, or whether it is more akin to the foreign law of single nations and
thus to be assessed under different criteria.60 This assessment presents a duality
of possible outcomes because regional law does indeed have a hybrid nature
and therefore does present characteristics of both international law and the law
of purely domestic regimes. For example, the constituent documents of many
regional organizations such as the European Union are treaties,61 and thus
resemble international law in its purest sense, but within such treaties there are
often provisions, such as a bill of rights, that therefore resemble domestic
law.62 Moreover, even though the rulemaking of these regional organizations
often concerns the relationships between the constituent states (resembling
58

Steven Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 591, 612 (2000). Much of the debate surrounds the issue of how to determine whether a substantive rule
of international governance is soft law or ripened customary law. Several factors have been identified to best
determine the answer to this question, including looking at “the form, subject matter, and content of a
document, as well as the intention of the parties.” Id. at 613.
59 See infra Part IV.B.2.
60 Foreign domestic law is certainly part of those sources that can and should be used comparatively as
an aid to U.S. domestic constitutional interpretation, but the methodology of its deployment, given its different
generative policy purpose, should not be the same as that presented herein for international law. See, e.g.,
Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13.
61 See TFEU.
62 See, e.g., Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) art. 6 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (incorporating
and making binding upon all member states the European Convention on Human Rights).
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international law), it might also reflect localized cultural effects pertinent to
that region of the world (and thus be more domestic in nature).
Even though this topic alone could be the subject of a whole article in its
own right, on balance it is preferable to treat the law of regional bodies as
international law rather than as domestic law. The paramount reason for doing
this is that regional law, like international law, is the product of a comingtogether of more than one state at the very least, and, in most circumstances,
many different states. Thus it reflects a collective rational choice that is
international in its scope, unlike most domestic law. In other words, the
international ramifications of a domestic governing choice—be it executive,
legislative, judicial, or administrative—are seldom considered (unless the very
topic of such choice is international), but the international consequences of the
choices of the diverse entities encompassed within the organizational
framework of regional bodies are almost always paramount to such choices.
Therefore, the jurist contemplating the use of regional law as a source of
persuasive authority for interpreting the U.S. Constitution should analyze that
law from an international law, rather than a foreign domestic law,
perspective.63
II. THE NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The use of international law within the ambit of U.S. domestic
constitutional interpretation does not take place in a vacuum. Rather, it exists
within the specific context of a global comparative enterprise where
governmental bodies of all nations are cross-borrowing materials from both
international and foreign domestic law. This enterprise operates with numerous
policy goals in mind and has at its heart a theoretical ethos that permeates the
whole process.
In general, “[c]omparative legal practice is founded on an underlying idea
that the laws of the world are commensurable or comparable, and on an
equally fundamental idea that comparison can only continue to take place
amidst ongoing diversity.”64 That is to say, “the contribution of comparative
63

See infra Part IV.
H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Law and Legal Practice, 75 TUL. L. REV. 977, 1002 (2001); see also
Ursula Bentele, Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s Experience with Comparative
Constitutional Law, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 221 (2009) (exploring the views of the Justices of the
Supreme Court of South Africa and noting that “[w]hether identifying universal norms, or gaining insight into
the comparable constitutional provisions, these justices see clear benefits from exploring the opinions of
constitutional courts in other parts of the world”).
64
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law emanates not from pseudoscientific information gathering
pretense . . . . What comparativists share . . . is a passion for looking beyond,
an empathy for differences but also for similarities, a faith in the selftransformative task of learning, and an interest in the form of knowledge
itself.”65 Thus, the aim of comparative law “is less to borrow than to seek the
benefit of comparative deliberation.”66 Because of this broad scope,
comparative law does not merely confine itself to the context of constitutional
issues (although the recent spate of articles on this matter seem to limit
themselves to this context), but can also be invoked in cases involving
statutory or common law questions, so that, in reality, comparative law is not
really a separate area of the law at all, but a methodology.67 That is not to say
that this methodology cannot have its own normative values separate and apart
from any normative values pertaining to the substantive areas of the law to
which, on a case-by-case basis, comparative principles are applied. But rather,
it is a simple acknowledgment of the fact that a better understanding of the
normative goals of comparative law can be achieved if one is cognizant of the
true nature of the practice.
A true understanding must also take into account the inherent normative
values operating within the comparative framework. In other words, when
embarking on any comparative endeavor, such as consulting international law
to help interpret the U.S. Constitution, the language adopted “affects what [the
jurists] say, what they see, how they think, what they feel, and what they
are.”68 Thus, constitutional interpretation that relies on comparative analysis
should not be viewed merely as a tool (which undoubtedly it is), but also as
something with intrinsic value, with its own legal and expressive qualities, and
possessing a normatively desirable “apolitical sensibility.”69 These normative
rationales establish the goals that are then to be reflected in the principled way

65 Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 221, 229 (1999).
66 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 197 (2003). Indeed,
“[i]t is a poor wit who lives by borrowing the words, decisions, inventions . . . and actions of others.”
TREASURY OF SPIRITUAL WISDOM: A COLLECTION OF 10,000 INSPIRATIONAL QUOTATIONS (Andy Zubko ed.,
1996) (quoting Johann Kaspar Lavater).
67 See P. John Kozyris, Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New Horizons and New
Technologies, 69 TUL. L. REV. 165, 166–68 (1994).
68 JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 56
(1990) (referring to the language of economics).
69 David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND
TRANSITIONS 345, 345 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
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in which courts will decide how to use the proper sources of international law
as persuasive authority.
A. Globalization and Human Rights
A commonplace observation of the present day is that the world is
becoming increasingly interdependent. This interdependence manifests itself
most notably in areas such as international trade,70 multilateral environmental
agreements,71 and the pooling of political and military resources into
multinational organizations.72 The legal arena too has not been immune to this
interdependence,73 and is undergoing a process of “judicial globalization.”74
This fact, and the legal challenge it presents, has not been lost on some recent
members of the U.S. Supreme Court.75

70 In the modern era, public institutions such as the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) and the Rome International Institute for the Unification of Private International Law
(“Unidroit”) have taken on an active role in developing transnational commercial law. See BEDERMAN, supra
note 22, at 147. Similarly, modern NGOs comprised of merchants have “exercised substantial influence in
making transnational commercial law.” Id.
71 See id. at 141 (discussing various multilateral environmental efforts including the 1979 Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
and the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change).
72 See, e.g., id. at 229–30 (discussing the 1998–1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo).
73 For example, Sujit Choudhry has noted that a proper understanding of modern constitutions can only
be achieved through both local and global perspectives. See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of
Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 824 (1999).
74 Judicial globalization is described by Slaughter as a “messy” process of judicial interaction which is
both vertical (between national and supranational courts, the former of which may or may not be bound to
follow decisions of the latter) and horizontal (between equivalent national courts not bound to follow each
other’s decision or bound by any formal mandate). See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1103, 1103 (2000). Slaughter identifies five broad activities that constitute judicial globalization:
(1) the interaction between national courts and supranational courts for the creation of a structured pannational legal system (with emphasis on Europe); (2) the march towards common human rights norms; (3)
deference to foreign courts through comity; (4) national constitutional courts referencing each other in matters
concerning interpretations of parallel constitutional provisions; and (5) meeting between the personnel of the
courts in question. See generally id.
75 Justice Breyer has stated that

[w]e see all the time, Justice O’Connor and I, and the others, how the world really—it’s trite but
it’s true—is growing together. . . . Through commerce, through globalization, through the spread
of democratic institutions, through immigration to America, it’s becoming more and more one
world of many different kinds of people. . . . And how they’re going to live together across the
world will be the challenge, and whether our Constitution and how it fits into the governing
documents of other nations, I think will be a challenge for the next generations.
John H. Cushman, Jr., O’Connor Indicates She Will Remain on Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2003, at A1.
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From the normative standpoint, this increased global interdependence and
its effect on the legal arena calls for a parallel increase in the use of
international materials as persuasive authority for both pragmatic and
substantive reasons. First, it seems common sensical that a jurisprudence that
relies, to some extent, on comparative analysis, will better manage global legal
relationships in general.76 Specifically, in those circumstances involving
interpretations of constitutional provisions, seeking the wisdom of international
materials is desirable given that “[c]onstitutional experience in other nations
has become relevant to U.S. legal culture because of the tighter connections
between legal practice in the United States and elsewhere that have developed
in the past few decades.”77
Second, the increase in communication between nations creates a global
community, not just of the courts, but also of structured humankind.78 This
leads participants in international legal discourse to think about themselves as
“juridical citizens of the world,” rather than as representatives of a particular
nation.79 This self re-identification that transcends institutional relationships
creates a heightened sense of common enterprise and kinship that, within the
legal consciousness, is expressed by a greater awareness of the international
dimensions of those rights “that attach to all persons by virtue of being
human”—that is, human rights.80 In other words, human rights are based on a
commonality of human values that only in recent times has been highlighted

76 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 291 (2000) (describing the desirability of global governance through international institutions from a
pragmatic perspective).
77 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1306.
78 See Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 212–13 (2000);
see also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999, 2001
(2003) (“Constitutions are community dependent, and the world is, to an increasing extent, a single community
working from a shared set of core values when it comes to the definition of baseline human rights.”).
79 Scott & Alston, supra note 78, at 213.
80 See Jackson, supra note 15, at 45. In other words, people are governed by law that encapsulates
principles that are “common to humanity” and the challenging of this law by foreign sources only strengthens
the underlying principles embodied by those laws. See H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J.
261, 298 (1987) (quoting Gaius); see also Lord Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965) (“[S]ociety is not something that is kept together physically; it is held by
the invisible bonds of common thought.”). From this universalist perspective, comparative law can be seen as
“bridging the gap between law and society.” Ahron Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court
in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 28 (2002). This follows from the “constantly changing” nature of
society. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 10–11 (Greenwood Press 1970)
(1928).
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by the globalization process.81 Comparative law, in collaboration with
international law, helps promote the international human rights agenda by
acting within each nation through the voluntary pronouncements of each
nation’s own state actors (as opposed to international law alone, which
superimposes the supranational collective will upon each nation).82 Thus,
decisions resulting from comparative analysis by domestic courts, as a means
for the promotion of international human rights, have the potential to acquire a
certain domestic legitimacy83 that rulings from international tribunals—that are
far-removed from the general populace—do not.84
The normative values that comparative law serves in the promotion of
international human rights are both fundamental and egalitarian in nature.85
The internationalization of these values is occurring because “[a]round the
world, public law concepts are emerging, rooted in shared national norms and
emerging international norms, that have similar or identical meaning in every
national system.”86 Examples of these fundamental rights include “the concept
of ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ in human rights law, the concept of
‘civil society’ in democracy law, the concept of ‘the internally displaced’ in
refugee and immigration law, [and] the concept of ‘transborder trafficking’ of
drugs and persons in criminal law.”87 Thus, because of the important role
played by comparative law in this area, “no longer is it appropriate to speak of
the impact or influence of certain courts in other countries, but rather of the

81 See John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State Consent to State
Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 433, 447 (1997).
82 This view of the role of comparative law squares with Judge Posner’s observation that law can be “an
instrument for social ends.” RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 405 (1995).
83 Legitimacy is not solely contingent on the mere use of comparative analysis, but also may depend on
methodology of reasoning. See Choudhry, supra note 73, at 824. Choudhry, through a detailed examination of
comparative interpretative methods (primarily by foreign courts) identifies three “interpretative modes”: the
universalist (premised on a commonality of underlying norms and principles), the genealogical (through a
shared historic relationship), and the dialogic (a reflective process whereby the normative component of the
“home” constitution is identified and then related, or not, to the foreign counterpart). See id. at 825.
84 Thus, even though the European Court of Human Rights, whose decisions can formulate the
interpretation of other human rights conventions and treaties, has a powerful voice as a promoter of
international human rights law, see J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European
Court of Human Rights 18 (2d ed. 1993), its decisions on their own have relatively little impact on the rest of
the world not covered by its jurisdiction.
85 As expressed by Aristotle long ago: “We must urge that the principles of equity are permanent and
changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws
often do change.” Aristotle, Rhetorica, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1318, 1374 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1941).
86 Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 305, 306 (2001).
87 Id.
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place of all courts in the global dialogue on human rights and other common
legal questions.”88 The impact of using international materials as sources of
persuasive authority to aid in domestic decisions pertaining to human rights
issues is aptly summarized by former Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court
of Canada:
[I]n the field of human rights, and of other laws impinging on the
individual, our courts are assisting in developing general and
coherent principles that apply in very significant portions of the
globe. These principles are applied consistently, with an international
vision and on the basis of international experience. Thus our courts—
and many other national courts—are truly becoming international
courts in many areas involving the rule of law. They will become all
the more so as they continue to rely on and benefit from one
another’s experience. Consequently, it is important that, in dealing
with interstate issues, national courts fully perceive their role in the
international order and national judges adopt an international
89
perspective.

That is not to say that the comparative enterprise is an exclusive alternative
to international law in the promotion of international human rights.90 In fact,
international law is “a legitimate and important influence on the development
of the common law and constitutional law, especially when international law
declares the existence of universal and fundamental rights.”91 Indeed, “[t]he
rising use of international law in domestic courts across jurisdictions
constitutes both symptom and cause of this globalization.”92 However, because
comparative analysis by design passes through domestic gatekeepers
(specifically, the local judges who render their decisions), it has the advantage
of greater efficiency in that the normative goals are given immediate effect

88

Claire L’Heureux-Dube, Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA
L.J. 15, 40 (1998).
89 Gerard V. La Forest, The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law
Issues, 34 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 100–01 (1996).
90 Like comparative law, the international law component of international human rights jurisprudence is
also instinctively egalitarian. See Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights,
and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2000) (“International law does not see this world of
politics based on power, threat, and sacrifice. Indeed, its contemporary ambition is to overcome this world, to
achieve a fundamentally depoliticized global order of equality among states and universal respect for the
individual.”).
91 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, 657 (citing Mabo v.
Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 42).
92 Reem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International Law in
Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555, 555 (2002).
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through a domestic ruling.93 Therefore, the agenda of international human
rights is best served by the comparative enterprise, and doubly so if some of
the sources of foreign persuasive authority are international law materials
(originating from domestic courts or international bodies) that pertain to
international human rights.
B. Similar Problems, Similar Backgrounds, and Similar Texts
The “communitarian considerations” that give rise to the usefulness of
international persuasive authority in the area of human rights are equally
applicable to other areas of the law.94 Thus, in more general terms, “as social
debates and discussions around the world become more and more similar, so of
course, do the equivalent legal debates.”95 Consequently, because “[s]tates are
intricately linked by shared problems that require multilateral solutions,”96
comparative analysis will be useful and desirable as one of the means to shed
light on such problems.97 More often than not, the similar “problems”
encountered by courts of different nations are linked by shared principles that
are so common that they create a “normative backdrop,” such backdrop
imposing the direction of the resolution.98 These common principles form a
“family” of ideas all interrelated like a tapestry, such that the “strength of the
thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole
length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.”99 Reference to international law
materials thus functions as the needle, connecting the related threads as a way
of dealing with the reality that exists today of easily accessible foreign
93 Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court of Canada describes this process as one of “absorbing
international legal norms . . . through our constitutional pores.” La Forest, supra note 89, at 98.
94 See Bahdi, supra note 92, at 589.
95 L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 88, at 23.
96 Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 417 (2000).
97 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 534–36
(1992) (adding that comparative analysis only retains its usefulness if the results are narrowly fitted to take
into consideration the needs of the society to be affected by the decision).
98 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 507–08 (1989)
(applying this reasoning to the interpretation of statutes). The commonality of such principles has been noted
by the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the court indicated that the
rights denied by Colorado’s Amendment 2 are “protections taken for granted by most people either because
they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.” Id. at 633.
99 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 221 (4th ed. 1963). For example, several
international and national declarations, constitutions, treaties, or statutes offer similar protections for the
individual that there is, among certain nations, “a wide convergence of paramount constitutional norms.”
Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Migration and the Bounds of Comparative Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 67, 69 (2001).
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decisions that have previously rendered opinions on issues similar to those
being tackled by our domestic courts.100
Clearly, the connections between the foreign courts that cite international
law and domestic ones that do the same will be stronger in certain instances
than in others. Like for people, the strongest linkage identified by scholars is
that deemed to be among legal “relatives.”101 Thus, a foreign nation found on
the same family tree as that of the United States, will possess a “genealogic”
link that will make comparative references to the jurisprudence of that foreign
nation especially relevant,102 particularly when those references encompass the
utilization of international law as persuasive authority. That would seem to
primarily limit comparative references to countries whose law is in part based
on the old English common law,103 but in light of the influence of U.S.
jurisprudence on the rest of the world, courts in this nation need not confine
themselves to referencing sources from countries that helped shape the legal
landscape in the United States, but rather, domestic courts could similarly
benefit from the insight of courts from nations that have received legal input
from the United States if those nations shed any light on a proper methodology
for the use of international law as nonbinding authority. In either event,
referencing international materials being used as persuasive authority by
nations with a familial relationship to the United States is normatively
justified, and is similar in conception, to one state referencing, as persuasive
authority, the laws of a sister state within the union.
100 In a sense then, one could argue that there is a pragmatic reason to favor referencing foreign materials
as persuasive authority. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227
(1999); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (explaining the
virtues of pragmatist thought). Interestingly, Judge Posner seems to have mixed feelings about whether he
favors this type of comparative practice. On the one hand, he has written that comparative law can be useful to
the determination of certain cases dealing with Eighth Amendment issues, see Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic
Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 14 (1996), but on the other hand, he has recently stated that a court in
the United States “should never view a foreign legal decision as a precedent in any way.” Posner, supra note
14, at 40. In a similar pragmatic vein, H.L.A. Hart has suggested that the use of comparative law can be part of
the penumbral zone of judicial thinking, and in those instances, a decisionmaker can reference foreign
materials to reach a conclusion. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 255 (2d ed. 1977).
101 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 15, at 46 (identifying those “relatives” as being “international or foreign
texts inspired or influenced by the United States”).
102 The “genealogic” link is one of the three “interpretative modes” identified by Choudhry. See
Choudhry, supra note 73, at 824.
103 See Posner, supra note 14, at 40 (noting that “[a]n English decision from the 18th century might be
cited to establish the original meaning of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ in the Eighth Amendment”); see also
Shirley S. Abramson, & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 277 n.13 (1997) (noting that English law is mostly cited when it is old for historical
context and examining Wisconsin citations on the matter).
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Equally strong normative justification for referencing international
materials arises in those cases where the international authority being
scrutinized has interpreted texts similar to those under review by the domestic
court.104 Indeed, it “would be a serious omission . . . to ignore this relevant
body of precedents and the considerable judgment and experience they
represent as it confronts similar difficult interpretive questions.”105 Even
opponents of this enterprise concede that “[f]oreign materials are relevant to
the interpretation of U.S. laws in numerous circumstances, most notably where
the foreign courts have interpreted the same or parallel legal texts as those
under consideration by the U.S. court.”106 Therefore, the adage that declaims
“two heads are better than one” applies in this context and advises consultation
of opinions which turn on similar textual interpretations as those being
undertaken by the referencing court. Or, as succinctly put by Justice Breyer,
“[i]f here I have a human being called a judge in a different country dealing
with a similar problem, why don’t I read what he says if it’s similar enough?
Maybe I’ll learn something.”107 A similar sentiment can be equally applied to a
judge sitting on an international tribunal.
C. Coordinating a Transnational Legal System
With the proliferation of international agreements and treaties that has
taken place over the last three decades, it was only a matter of time before
litigation stemming from these agreements found its way into the domestic
courts of participating nations. The application of international norms found in
treaties by domestic judges has been relatively uncontroversial because the
general opinion is that the ratification of a treaty constitutes a legally
significant act, and that domestic courts should strive to hold national
governments accountable to their legal commitments embodied by such

104 See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional
Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 254 (2001); see also Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 685, 691–95 (1976).
105 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 374 (1997).
106 See Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R.
Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2d Sess.
21 (2004) (testimony of Prof. Michael Ramsey).
107 Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Antonin Scalia, Debate on Foreign Law: Constitutional Relevance
of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/
posts.
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ratification.108 More controversy has arisen by applying this rationale to
customary international law because, as critics claim, customary international
law is not always formed with the consent of those allegedly bound by it.109
Regardless of international law’s application domestically through treaties or
customary law,
[s]tripped of all technicalities . . . government in all its actions is
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make
it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its
coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual
110
affairs on the basis of this knowledge.

The application of international law domestically not only serves to hold the
government accountable to its people but, more importantly for the purpose of
this Article, allows foreign nations to observe that the United States will live
up to its international obligations, thus making other nations more willing to
engage in a cooperative relationship with the United States. In other words,
“[i]f international law does not have any impact on behavior, there is no reason
for a country to waste resources on international legal conventions and
negotiations.”111
Comparative analysis based on international materials aids the further
development of this cooperative relationship established by international law
and the bodies that administer it. In fact, the “role of international institutions
is increasingly, with the spread of liberal democracy, to help coordinate the
policies of democratic states to promote common goals, including the full
protection of human rights, within a context of substantial underlying

108 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118
YALE L.J. 1762, 1774 (2009) (explaining that “when international treaties become domestic law” via
incorporation by the political branches, they become U.S. law that has “legal force . . . [and] give[s] rise to
obligations within the legal regime of international law”). This rationale has been termed the “rule of law
imperative.” See Bahdi, supra note 92, at 560. It is focused on a previously enacted treaty or accepted rule of
customary law—in other words, international norms. In this optic “the rule of law framework represents the
positivistic expression of state consent.” Id. at 565.
109 For example, Eric Posner has characterized this approach to judicial domestication of international
norms as “Transnational Legal Process” (“TLP”). Posner expresses skepticism towards this approach, under
which he says “courts act . . . under their own authority to compel citizens and the government to comply with
international law that has never been formally incorporated into domestic law by the government . . . often
called customary international law.” Eric A. Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court’s
2003–2004 Term: Some Skeptical Observations, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 23, 26 (2004).
110 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944).
111 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1844
(2002).
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agreement.”112 Thus, the coordinating necessity brought on by globalization is
the source for an increase in the use of international law.113 This coordination,
particularly in the area of international commerce, brings about a redefinition
of the notion of the national “we,” because “who we are is harder to define
when Japanese firms are major exporters from the United States, American
firms produce more overseas than they export, and NGOs and political leaders
who pressed for the land mines treaty [which the United States government
opposed] included large numbers of Americans.”114 This “changing
consciousness” in which the international and domestic courts are mutually
reinforcing, leads to an emergence of “international” values that are capable of
being applied at the national level, creating a “common language which cuts
across boundaries and within societies,” which induces further cooperation and
integration.115
The step from a coordinating international law to a coordinating
comparative practice is a very small one. Already, national courts are “quasiautonomous actors in the international system,” acting as “partners in
enforcing international rules or as participants in a larger dynamic process of
socialization in the service of compliance.”116 This has led to a “blurring of
international law into comparative law.”117 Thus, “when a judge in a state that
is not party to the European Convention on Human Rights invokes the
Convention and its jurisprudence, the Convention has the same non-binding
status as foreign law.”118 This merging of comparative law and international
governance is a logical consequence in that both confront the same problems
of “order above states,” which results in a need for effective cooperation.119
112

Moravcsik, supra note 76, at 305.
See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99,
129 (1994).
114 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER 164 (2002).
115 See Phillippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 527, 554–56 (2001).
116 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 391–92 (1998).
117 Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
501, 525 (2000).
118 Id. (emphasis omitted). In other words, the deployment of international law as part of U.S.
constitutional interpretation treats international law as a form of foreign law. See Spiro, supra note 78, at
2025–27.
119 See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 557, 614–15 (arguing that in today’s project of “international
governance,” comparativists seek to act as the “diversity department” to create a depoliticized private law and
defend the autonomy of law). The author does recognize an essential difference between the objectives of
international law and comparative law: the former seeking to “transcend [rather] than to comprehend
113
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D. Judicial Dialogue
A related goal of comparative analysis to cooperation is to foster an
ongoing dialogue between courts around the world. This “global community of
law” which consists of “overlapping networks of national, regional, and global
tribunals,”120 arises as a result of a new self-conception of each participant
court as being part of a “larger judicial community” that crosses artificial
notions of territoriality,121 and communicates among itself through judicial
opinions and decisions. Thus, “[b]y communicating with one another in a form
of collective deliberation about common legal questions, these tribunals [which
participate in the dialogue] can reinforce each other’s legitimacy and
independence from political interference” and “can also promote a global
conception of the rule of law, acknowledging its multiple historically and
culturally contingent manifestations but affirming a core of common
meaning.”122 This “community of law” is characterized by relationships
between legal “actors”123 that are consistent with each individual participant’s
interests, coupled with the participants’ awareness that the whole process takes
place on a nominally apolitical plane.124 In sum, “a community of law is a
community of interests and ideals shielded by legal language and practice,”125
whose desirability arises from the recognition that proper legal practice is not
necessarily confined to one system and nation.
The specific content of the dialogue, and the particular motivation of the
conversing courts, will vary considerably depending on which courts are
“speaking” to one another. Moreover, the type of reception that a particular
difference,” while for the latter the goal is not to transcend difference, but to explore it (to see “what’s in, and
out, who’s good and bad, what’s new and old”) in order to decide its relevance and its persuasive capabilities.
See id. at 546–47.
120 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 105, at 282, 370 (noting that judges around the world consider
themselves as part of this global legal community “by virtue of either their role in implementing international
norms or a common conception of their role and function within domestic legal systems and a common
commitment to the rule of law”). This type of self-conception provides for a natural opening to foreign
materials as persuasive authority.
121 See Bahdi, supra note 92, at 558.
122 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 105, at 282.
123 This emphasis on “actors” signifies that, like for many other rationales underlying comparative
analysis, a transnational judicial dialogue relies on a notion of horizontal global governance—one consisting of
“national government officials rather than international bureaucrats, decentralized and informal rather than
organized and rigid.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks,
in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 178, 202–03 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
124 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 105, at 367–69.
125 Id. at 370.
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international source will receive in a domestic court will similarly vary
considerably in each particular circumstance.126 Thus, the “dialogic” process is
an interactive one,127 where the tenor of conversation might not always be one
of agreement.128 As noted by Anne-Marie Slaughter,
[W]hereas a presumption of a world of separate sovereigns mandates
courtesy and periodic deference between them, the presumption of an
integrated system [where judicial dialogue is commonplace] takes
mutual respect for granted and focuses instead on how well that
system works. It is a shift that is likely to result in more dialogue but
129
less deference.

However, the shift to open dialogue implies a greater reflective process by
the deciding courts. This should tend to lead to better opinions because
“decisions about what ought to be done are improved by reflection, by an
exchange of views with others sharing the same problems, and by imagining
various situations that might be presented.”130
E. Expanding Horizons
The evolution of legal history is replete with highly esoteric discussions
concerning the ultimate goal of the law. Notions of order, fairness, justice,
utility, structure, and equality (as well as many others) have been tossed
around as being the primary engine that drives the legal train.131 Regardless of
the legal philosophy to which one subscribes, it can scarcely be contradicted by
anyone that the legal product in any legal system should strive to be as good
and correct as it can be. The selective reliance on international persuasive
authority goes a long way into achieving this in legal systems, such as ours,

126 In other words, “as courts look all over the world for sources of authority, the process of international
influence has changed from reception to dialogue.” L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 88, at 17, 21 (stating that as
courts “mutually read and discuss each other’s jurisprudence,” in order to determine new problems,
comparative sources become part of the “broad spectrum of sources,” used by the courts).
127 See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 EUR. L.J. 259, 265 (1995)
(describing the relationship between the European Court of Justice and national supreme courts as “pluralistic
rather than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical”).
128 See, e.g., Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 702 (Can.) (stating where this dialogue resulted in
an informed rejection of the foreign source).
129 Slaughter, supra note 74, at 1115; Slaughter, supra note 66, at 194.
130 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 668
(1958). Fuller imagines that such a completeness of deliberation results “not merely [in] a more apt choice of
means for the end sought, but a clarification of the end itself.” Id.
131 See generally LUIGI MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY APPLIED TO LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
(A.M. Kelley 1968) (1912).
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where adjudicators are called upon to use interpretative skills in providing a
resolution to a legal problem.132
Specifically, by deploying international law used comparatively, the judge
“expands the horizon and the interpretive field of vision,” so that
“[c]omparative law enriches the options available.”133 This squares with the
comparativist ethos which does not solely aspire to rule, but to understand the
underlying nature of each decision.134 The quest of understanding inevitably
leads to a necessity to have the mind of the jurist be stretched and stimulated, a
process that will result in a better legal product.135 In the immortal words of
Justice Brandeis, “if we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold.”136
One of the ways in which such stimulation will occur is through access to
international materials’ rationales on similar issues to those being treated in the
domestic forum. These sources of international law might provide the domestic
court with a “fresh, provocative” way to resolve the issue at hand, and thus it
will inform, illuminate, and challenge a domestic court’s long-held
assumptions.137 “[T]he use of comparative law can inspire the interpreter to
find the interpretation that is best with regard to his own country’s law” by
“provid[ing]the interpreter with new ideas” and by “contribut[ing] to the
interpreter’s understanding of the [text] he has to interpret.”138 In Bruce
Ackerman’s simple words, international law used as persuasive authority can
provide some “old-fashioned insight” to a reviewing domestic court.139

132 The implication is that ours is a system that relies, to a certain extent, on the indeterminacy of legal
issues and the jurists role in discovering the answer to a particular set of problems. Thus, the amplification of
the discovery process through the use of foreign materials fits into this conception of legal design, most
associated with realist legal theory. See, e.g., Knop, supra note 117, at 503.
133 AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 197 (2006).
134 See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 555–56.
135 See Jackson, supra note 104, at 259–60 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L.
REV. 659, 695 (1987)); Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 287, 291 (2001) (stating that this
comparison will “stimulate [the] mind with analogous reasoning”).
136 Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 700 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Brandeis).
137 It is the mere fact of the challenge that in itself enhances the ultimate quality of the final judicial
product. See THOMAS MUNRO, TOWARD SCIENCE IN AESTHETICS 73 (1956) (noting that a judge, “[b]y
comparing his judgment with those of others . . . can further discover the extent to which it is in accord with
the consensus of social experience [and] [i]f he then still reaffirms his [initial] judgment, it will be a more
conscious and tested one, and less a product of blind impulse”).
138 Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 14
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513, 522–23 (2002).
139 See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 775 (1997).

GLENSY GALLEYSFINAL

224

6/28/2011 9:54 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

The impact of observing international law practice in a particular
circumstance not only ameliorates the specifics of that case, but also
contributes to the betterment of the legal system as a whole by bringing to the
table new, valuable, substantive ideas. Justice Ginsburg expressed her
appreciation of the possibilities of international materials (among other foreign
sources) to U.S. jurisprudence in these exact terms when she noted that the
Supreme Court could “do better” if it incorporated comparative analysis from
other nations “who by years of labor, research and experience, have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.”140
Similarly, Goldsmith notes that international sources gather their strength
through substance (rather than process) and that it is the ideas contained within
these sources that contribute to their success.141 In other words, the addition of
international materials intrinsically enhances the discourse of the legal system
in which such materials are incorporated.
A third form of such expansion that is more pragmatic in nature
accompanies the intrinsic and particular expansion of horizons operated by
comparative analysis illustrated above. This specific normative impulse relies
on the use of comparative materials as a way “to achieve specific ends based
on positive reasoning about how those ends may be achieved.”142 Under this
guise, comparative analysis is integrated with other methods of judicial
reasoning, so that comparative references to international law not only affect
the results of the particular cases but also have an impact in shaping “the
system within which [they] operate[].”143 Thus, the practice of referencing
international law as persuasive authority expands the panoply of methods that
enable judges to adequately explain the rationales behind their opinions,
enhancing the level of persuasiveness and legitimacy of the particular decision
and the court rendering it. The exploration of international materials within
judicial opinions for the sake of strengthening the conclusions reached therein
is therefore conceptually pragmatic because pragmatism evaluates “the success
of a philosophy not in terms of its correspondence to ultimate eternal truths,
140 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (quoting the Court in The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
141 Jack L. Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 327, 337 (2000) (referring to the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki
Accords).
142 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Liberal
International Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 719
(1995).
143 Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 412 (2003).
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but based upon its usefulness as a practical tool to yield better, more satisfying
experiences.”144 That is not to stay that method, or style, is less important than
intrinsic merit. In fact, style “is important, not only in the message conveyed to
lower courts, but also in what it says about the attitudes of those judges who
are choosing between different styles of decision-making.”145 The pragmatic
thought that underlies the use of international materials as persuasive authority
merely reflects a “relativistic theory [that] has wisely emphasized the danger of
deciding problems of valuation by appeal to any general standards, and has
urged instead that each problem be dealt with afresh, in its own terms, by
intelligent analysis of the special conditions involved in it.”146
The expansion of appropriate sources of persuasive authority to include
international law also serves the value of encouraging a jurisprudence that
moves forward by relying on past experience without foregoing the
progressive thrust of cautious experimentation. As stated by Justice Holmes,
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”147 Experience
is grounded in time, and is both individual and collective, the former being
more limited than the latter. As such,
[t]he experience of any moment has its horizon [in that] [e]ach man’s
experience may be added to by the experience of other men, who are
living in his day or have lived before; and so a common world of
experience, larger than that of his own observation, can be lived in by
148
each man

Nevertheless, “however wide it may be, that common world also has its
horizon; and on that horizon new experience is always appearing.”149 By
opening up to an international experience that has already resolved issues
being confronted by domestic courts for the first time, our courts can proceed
with an accumulated knowledge that provides the domestic adjudicator with a
ready-made illustration of the workability of that particular legal solution,

144 Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal
Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 688–89 (2003) (noting the local quality of pragmatism with respect to giving
solutions to problems, taking into account the peculiarities of the locality bound by the solution).
145 Harding, supra note 143, at 429.
146 MUNRO, supra note 137, at 78.
147 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Harvard ed., 1963) (1881).
148 SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY: A STUDY IN THE SYMBOLISM OF REASON, RITE,
AND ART 5 (3d ed. 1957) (quoting C. Delisle Burns, The Sense of the Horizon, 8 PHIL. 301 (1933)).
149 Id.
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which, in turn, alleviates the trepidation of being the first to introduce a
particular legal concept.150
Lastly, the limitless horizon brought forth by the experience of
international law helps to counter modern “know-nothingism”:151 a disturbing
undercurrent, or backwash, present in today’s American legal discourse. This
term refers to the implausible belief that the United States cannot possibly
benefit from “powerful and sophisticated” arguments of other legal regimes.152
This unilateral and arbitrary self-confinement only contributes to belittle a
legal system.153 It is axiomatic that a “lawyer, even in the most mundane
practice, will be impoverished if he wears the blinders of his own
jurisdiction.”154 Thus, because “no justice should cut off knowledge and
analysis of foreign law if it can help the court reach a better understanding of
our own,”155 aid should be “sought where it may be found, and there are no
formal limits to the search.”156
Limiting persuasive authority solely to the product originating within our
borders would fly in the face of prevalent legal theory that has developed
throughout the last century and has moved away from excessive formalism.
Thus, to the “extent that the law . . . is not definitely made and
imposed . . . but is rather chosen . . . in an ongoing process, the underlying
notion of law is that of enquiry” and as a consequence “[t]here is never a
150

See Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 331, 390 (1998) (referring to the prior experience of foreign courts as a sort of “field observation” of a
country where a specific concept has already been tested).
151 See Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 347, 352 (2000).
152 See id.
153 As observed by Justice Abramson of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin: “If you look at the American
law . . . in isolation from the rest of the world, you do not hear or ask [certain] questions” adopted by other
people. See Abramson & Fischer, supra note 103, at 284.
154 Kozyris, supra note 67, at 168.
155 Jackson, supra note 15, at 46.
156 Glenn, supra note 80, at 267 (noting that judges are “called upon to decide cases or enact norms or
give opinions, but the search for law is too important for any potential external source to be eliminated a
priori”). This “leave no stone unturned” concept is similar to Dworkin’s Judge Hercules, who, when
canvassing the whole of the relevant universe, will inevitably look across the oceans to see how foreign courts
have coped with similar questions and then square such authorities with the pertinent precedent, the textual
provisions, the normative questions, to reach the most informed and authoritative decision. See Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083 (1975). Some critics of comparative analysis deem Judge
Hercules not to be up to the task of comparative analysis. See Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and
Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 820–21 (2000) (stating that allowing foreign materials into the
process of domestic adjudication will “introduce[] a whole new range of materials to the texts, precedents and
doctrines from which the Herculean task of constructing judgments in particular cases proceeds”).
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closing of sources, never a declaration of satisfaction with existing knowledge,
never a pure process of deduction from a single given, never an entire
commitment to an exclusive paradigm of law.”157 In fact, “[t]he nationalization
of law has made it vulnerable[:] . . . [i]n seeking to bind it fails to persuade and
resistance becomes easier to justify than adherence.”158 This follows from the
fact that “[w]hen one is immersed in his own law, in his own country, unable
to see things from without, he has a psychologically unavoidable tendency to
consider as natural, as necessary, as given by God, things which are simply due
to historical accident or temporary social situation.”159 Therefore, “[t]o see
things in their true light, we must see them from a certain distance, as
strangers, which is impossible when we study . . . phenomena of our own
country.”160 Authorities steeped in international law allow us to achieve that
distance.
F. Increasing Self-Awareness
The analysis of international law materials as persuasive authority helps
courts in the United States enhance their knowledge and appreciation for the
legal practices of those international regimes being observed. However,
together with this increased erudition, comparative analysis of international
authority provides a “unique opportunity to generate critical, subversive selfreflections about American law.”161 In other words, comparative law functions
157 Glenn, supra note 80, at 288, 293 (tying the use of persuasive authority to a discrediting of the
“declaratory theory” of law which wants the judiciary simply to identify pre-existing law rather than
discovering the most persuasive result from any source available).
158 Id. at 297.
159 Kathryn A. Perales, It Works Fine in Europe, So Why Not Here? Comparative Law and Constitutional
Federalism, 23 VT. L. REV. 885, 902 (1999) (quoting Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35
HARV. L. REV. 838, 858 (1922)).
160 Id. Taking a few too many steps back for better observation works both figuratively and in actuality.
Bertrand Russell once observed that

if several people are looking at [an object] at the same moment, no two of them will see exactly
the same distribution of colours, because no two can see it from exactly the same point of view,
and any change in the point of view makes some change in the way the light is reflected.
BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 12 (1912). However, as proximity to the object
decreases, equality of perception by the two observers increases (even though it will never be exactly the
same). By combining the observations of the two watchers, a better picture of the actual shape of the object
will be produced. Similarly, by combining different national and foreign experiences on a particular legal
issue, a better resolution of that issue will be achieved.
161 George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 695 (1998)
(using the term “subversive” to denote a progressive impulse in opposition to an “establishment” mode of
preservation of the legal and structural status quo). But see Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1307 (viewing
comparative law as an agent for preservation or change).
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as a mirror so that by “seeking to learn from comparative . . . law, U.S.
lawyers, academics, and judges run the risk of going abroad only to meet
ourselves.”162 Specifically, comparative law “also operates like a rhetorical
literary device, such as satire or simile, by forcing national values out in the
open . . . [i]t offers judges a powerful tool to stimulate self-reflection and
introspection” facilitating “a process of introspection and self-discovery” that
“acts as a mirror that helps reflect the values already inherent, though not
altogether obvious, in the domestic order.”163
But the reflective power provided by comparative law not only produces a
superficial picture, but actually pierces the surface and thus is more akin to a
combination of mirror and x-ray machine.164 Thus, “comparing oneself to
others allows for greater self-knowledge,”165 a fundamental intrinsic value
described by Aristotle, among others.166 Under this rationale, a Supreme Court
(or lower court) espousing the comparative enterprise will function not only as
an adjudicator, but also as an educator,167 or analyst. In this way, comparative
law rises to an internal ethos, or self-sustaining motivating force, in contrast to
a purely determinate tool to be used as a means to an end.168

162 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1307 (applying this concept to comparative constitutional law); see also
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 57 (1983) (noting that foreign practices can provide a spotlight). Of
course, mirrors not only provide a reflection, but allow the observer to self-identify blemishes and other
markings on herself, a parallel equally applicable to the legal context and foreign law. See Knop, supra note
117, at 531 (citing Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and
Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, 6 WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1513 (1994) (“What always
seemed simple and natural becomes, through force of comparison, complex and problematic.”)).
163 Bahdi, supra note 92, at 575, 584 (applying the above rationale to international law and noting that
introspection plays into the persuasive nature of foreign sources as reference to these authorities occurs
“because [such authorities] reflect domestic norms and not because they oblige the nation in any way” thus
creating “spaces for judicial freedom”).
164 The imaging powers of mirrors and x-ray machines also illustrate the concept that ready-made
assumptions (about our health, for example) are much more complex than what is superficially apparent. As
phrased by Bertrand Russell: “In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are
found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to know what is
that we really may believe.” Russell, supra note 160, at 10. Foreign authority, thus, can expose the apparent
contradictions and complexities of our domestic law, which in turn leads to an internal reassessment through a
greater amount of thought.
165 Barak, supra note 80, at 110.
166 See ARISTOTLE, THE METAPHYSICS 11 (John H. McMahon trans., Prometheus Books 1991) (“All men
by nature are actuated with the desire of knowledge.”).
167 See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
961, 965 (1992).
168 See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. EUR. &
CIV. L.F. 49, 60 (1996).
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The impact of the increase in a nation’s legal self-awareness is not felt just
at home, but has consequences on the international arena. The interlocution of
international law materials can act as a signal to the international community
that the nation that is willing to be persuaded from abroad has earned itself a
rightful place among the community of nations. As noted by one commentator:
Globalized self-awareness reflects a judicial desire to be accepted by
an international community. This desire for acceptance betrays itself
most clearly when judges invoke the notion of “civilization.”
Judgments across jurisdictions proclaim the desire to be part of a
“civilized” world of judgment. The concept of civilization remains,
of course, inherently value laden and relational—one is not
“civilized” in isolation of others. Rather, the notion of being
“civilized” requires one to live up to certain standards that are
external to one’s self; it signals a desire for participation in and
acceptance by a community that has the power to define the standards
169
of acceptance.

Of course, acceptance into the community of nations (or at least within the
community referenced in the quotation above that calls itself “civilized” from a
Western viewpoint) can come at any time in the life a particular nation. Thus,
in the case of post-apartheid South Africa, the Supreme Court of that country
has made it clear that the use of foreign law in domestic decisionmaking serves
the purpose of announcing the arrival of the new South Africa to the world.170
Put another way, the judge of this emerging democracy signals, through the
use of foreign law, that his legal “culture is already open to learning from
experience elsewhere.”171 Citing to foreign law therefore becomes a way of
enhancing the product to a specific audience.172
This self-defining form of self-awareness used to announce oneself to the
world is not confined to nations but is equally applicable to institutional
bodies. Hence the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights have enhanced each other’s standing by persistently referencing
each other’s decisions.173 The increasing reliance by these bodies on
169

Bahdi, supra note 92, at 591.
See S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
171 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1304.
172 See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 502 (2000) (discussing how judges
have made efforts to use human rights law as a “distancing device” to settle disputes without appearing to rely
on personal taste or political judgment).
173 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 105, at 326 (explaining that the constant cross-referencing of
decisions enables comparative law to function as a tool to enhance self-legitimacy); see also Thijmen
170
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international sources as a self-legitimizing force indicates that self-definition
might not necessarily commence at the beginning of a new era (such as the
birth of the post-apartheid South African state), but can occur in the middle of
an ongoing process.174 In such instances, comparative analysis has a
“redemptive” character,175 and encompasses a search for a collective identity
that encompasses a historical perspective that attempts to assess the question of
“where we come from” in contemporary and forward-looking terms.
G. Impact on the Rest of World
One of the staples of the United States’s success in the world in terms of its
influence on other countries has been its ability to reshape other nations in its
image.176 This reshaping ability of the United States is active in numerous
international spheres such as international relations and international trade.177
Furthermore, the legal arena has similarly been a theater in which the United
States has “stepped up [its] role abroad in spreading the gospel about the
virtues of the American legal system.”178 Continuing with the biblical parallel,
it becomes apparent that the most effective way for “spreading the gospel” is to
practice what one preaches. Thus, foreign nations are to be most impressed and
influenced by an American legal system that is engaged within a judicial
dialogue with other nations (through the use of comparative law)179 in the same
way that engagement in international relations promotes both stability and
Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 505
(1991) (arguing that it is comparative reasoning which has increased the European Court of Justice’s standing
by force of the intellectual prowess that such reasoning involves).
174 For example, the Treaty of Rome, which established the framework of the European Economic
Community (the precursor to the European Union), was negotiated and approved by sovereign states without
moving toward European “political-decisional-procedural” integration. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2410 (1991). However, in time, the Treaty of Rome was judicially converted (to
a certain extent, through comparative reasoning) into a more “constitution-like” document. See id. at 2403–31
(detailing the “constitutionalization” of the community legal structure).
175 See Ackerman, supra note 139, at 794–95.
176 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology of National Greatness and Liberty, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 7, 10 (Thomas G. Patterson ed., 3d ed. 1989).
177 See, e.g., AKIRA IRIYE, ACROSS THE PACIFIC: AN INNER-HISTORY OF AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN
RELATIONS 335–37 (2d ed. 1991) (describing how the United States’s use of Cold War defense treaties in East
Asia allowed South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan to focus on developing capitalists economies and how internal
political stability resulted in domination by leaders committed to a U.S. alliance); Hunt, supra note 176.
178 Abramson & Fischer, supra note 103, at 278 (commenting about the disconnect between this
“spreading the gospel” attitude and American lawyers’ and judges’ reluctance to venture outside their borders
to look for answers to domestic legal issues).
179 If there be any doubt of the potential reach and impact of U.S. court decisions in the world, one might
only need to read the words of Justice L’Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada. See L’HeureuxDube, supra note 88, at 19 (showing how U.S. Supreme court decisions have influenced the Canadian courts).
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security for the United States.180 From this perspective, the reasons for
participating in a global enterprise of comparative analysis track those for
partaking in the creation of customary international law. In particular, the
United States, by being the center of creating customary international law will
impact and shape such law, and not abdicate its responsibility to less-than
trustworthy regimes.181
The other side of the coin is represented by the consequences for the United
States if it decides to forego the increasing judicial conversation that is taking
place between courts of different countries. The failure of U.S. courts to
engage in this enterprise “weakens America’s voice as a principled defender of
human rights around the world and diminishes America’s moral influence and
stature.”182 In fact, because of the raised profile of the United States in the
world, its actions are routinely more heavily scrutinized than those of other
nations, and any notion of the United States disengaging from international
dialogue, or behaving in a manner that is considered inappropriate by the
international community, results in a greater diminution of influence than if
those same actions were to be performed by another nation.183 This diminution
of influence is already beginning to take its course, in large part due to the
current Supreme Court’s predominantly regressive jurisprudence that has
shown hostility to ideas and authority that originate from abroad.184 Thus, even
though historically the United States has provided, through its Constitution,
inspiration to many fledgling democracies,185 “the recent direction of United
States constitutional jurisprudence has led most constitution-makers to seek
alternative models.”186 Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly used by

180

See Michael Byers, International Law and the American National Interest, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 257, 257

(2000).
181 See The International Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2061–62 (2001).
182 Roth, supra note 151, at 347.
183 For example, segregation had a significant negative impact on the United States’s relationships with
other countries. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 100 (2000). Therefore, because “[a]n
international pariah becomes far less influential in the international sphere . . . the United States certainly
wants to retain a leading role in the creation of international law.” Steven R. Swanson, The Vexatiousness of a
Vexation Rule: International Comity and Antisuit Injuctions, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 11 (1996).
184 See Ginsburg, supra note 140; see also Adam Liptak, American Exception: U.S. Court is Now Guiding
Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html.
185 See generally Albert Blaustein, The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad, 12 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 435 (1987) (providing a historical overview of the U.S. Constitution’s influence on a number
of legal systems around the world, including upon the democracies of France, Japan, and India).
186 Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World
Constitutionalism,” 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 598.
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courts of other nations as a “counter-example” because “as a global
constitutionalism begins to flourish, this failure to engage [by the United States
Supreme Court (in particular)] threatens increasingly to marginalize the
experience of the constantly evolving United States Constitution that was once
the inspiration of all constitutionalists.”187
Concerns about the reputation of the United States’s legal system similarly
motivate an integration of comparative law within American jurisprudence.
Reputation is an important component of a nation’s ability to function on the
international stage, and historically, the United States, through its international
leadership and its “commitment to the rule of law and to the betterment of the
human situation,” obtained a reputation that drew other nations towards
adopting its values and outlook.188 But reputation is a characteristic that needs
constant feeding, and resting on its past laurels, or worse, showing disinterest
or contempt for the international stage,189 will result in long-term damage to
the United States’s reputation (which takes a long time to rebuild), with the
consequent diminution of its ability to impact other nations.190 By showing
willingness to consult legal ideas derived from international law principles,
courts in the United States can go some way towards increasing their clout on
the international stage, with the consequent improvement of the United States’s
international reputation on the whole. Ultimately, it is in the interest of the
United States to do so.
Nevertheless, the “pursuit of self-interest is tempered by recognition of the
legitimate interests of other players and a desire to encourage reciprocal
behavior.”191 That is, because of the assured interaction between the United
States (either through its institutions or its citizens) and foreign countries in the
future, the United States would want to guarantee itself a modicum of
treatment equal to the level of treatment such foreign countries (or their

187

Id. at 607, 616.
See Byers, supra note 180, at 259.
189 Such contempt was exhibited by the U.S. Supreme Court when it refused to follow (as a matter of
persuasive authority) the suggestion of the ICJ, which ruled that Virginia violated the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations when it failed to inform a foreign death-penalty defendant of his consular rights. See
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
190 For instance, “a decision to violate international law will increase today’s payoff but reduce
tomorrow’s” with respect to the effect of such decision on the reputation of the country undertaking such
decision. Guzman, supra note 111, at 1849.
191 Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State
Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920 (1992).
188
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citizens) would receive in the United States.192 Thus, reciprocity, assisted by
“transjudicial communication,”193 gives a regime a “longer shelf life”194 as it is
helped along by international cooperation (or non-interference) of foreign
nations.
Many scholars have noted that the current lack of reciprocity (personified
by the reticence of U.S. courts to participate in the comparative enterprise) is
not going unnoticed in international bodies and foreign countries.195
International judges too have noticed this retrenchment by the U.S. Supreme
Court and its failure to cite international sources, particularly from those
international tribunals that referred, or used to refer, to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s own decisions, thereby noting that (through reciprocity) those same
international tribunals are going to rely on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
with less and less frequency.196 This attitude is exemplified by a Canadian
Supreme Court decision preventing the extradition from Canada to the United
States of two defendants who faced the death penalty.197 It cited, among other
international authorities, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Knight v. Florida in
concluding that the death penalty was being phased out.198
The need to provide reciprocal treatment to other nations of the world has
been exacerbated by the fact that the world has become more interconnected,
and consequently, domestic law and activity increasingly have international
192

This might be referred to as the “golden rule” rationale that is similar to the classic formulations of
comity even though it has been argued that “comity must mean something more than a ‘golden rule’ for
private international law if it is to retain the character of a legal doctrine.” Joel R. Paul, Comity in International
Law, 32 HARV. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (1991). Justice Ginsburg specifically identifies comity and a “spirit of
humility” as reasons for engaging in comparative constitutionalism. Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 10.
193 See David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 571 (2001).
See generally Slaughter, supra note 113.
194 See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE
REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 69 (2000).
195 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 545, 550 (1995) (commenting that U.S. courts treat the abortion issue as though it were a unique
problem to the United States); Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to
Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273, 274 n.4 (1995) (noting that unlike U.S.
courts, German courts pay attention to other countries’ constitutional decisions).
196 See, e.g., Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537,
561 (1988) (making the same argument vis-à-vis foreign courts and pointing out that, although the United
States has tried to export its interpretation of human rights overseas, its failure to import foreign interpretation
of these rights has reduced its influence overseas).
197 United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.).
198 Id. para. 122. Contrary to the Knight majority opinion that rejected the very notion of comparative
analysis, Burns invoked foreign authority to question the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied in
that particular instance.
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consequences, and vice versa.199 As a result of this interconnection, the United
States has demonstrated that it holds no reservations to imposing laws and
regulations over activities occurring abroad that supposedly have effect within
its territory.200 It seems inconsistent to advocate a one-way ratchet approach to
the effects of globalization that allows for exports but is resistant to imports,
particularly when imports serve the same interests as do the exports. In fact,
this excessive nation-centric view of the world, with the premise that any legal
thought of any importance can only originate from the United States, seems
largely obsolete in the new world order, and has already been rejected by the
United States in areas such as international trade.201 Like recent developments
in the area of international trade, the use of international law as persuasive
authority for domestic cases merely acknowledges today’s global reality and
serves the United States by offering reciprocity to other nations, thus
enhancing its stature on the international legal stage.
H. Conclusion
Comparative analysis, like other legal disciplines, draws its strength from
its normative justifications and their validity. This Part has described what
various commentators have identified as the major goals (both intrinsic and
instrumental) that the comparative practice serves for the United States. On the
whole, advocates of the comparative enterprise tend not to fall into the same
trap as do the formalist detractors of the practice, and concede that there are no
“one-size-fits-all” uses for this discipline. Indeed, there is a general agreement,
that one of the fundamental precepts of comparativism is its fluidity, meaning
its functioning in a persuasive role, rather than a binding one.202 Hence, the
normative justifications identified above will not always all be present in cases
in which comparative analysis might be appropriate, and, in many instances,
will not be present at all, thus obviating any need for such analysis.
199 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1672
(1997) (quoting Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125,
130) (stating that “[a]s integration increases, the ‘effect’ that local action will have beyond its own local border
increases”).
200 See, e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 176–77 (2001) (discussing the “effects doctrine” and the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws).
201 For example, the United States has seen it to be in its interest to abide by, and push for enforcement of,
international trade laws through its membership in the World Trade Organization. The World Trade
Organization, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateralaffairs/-world-trade-organization (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
202 See, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, The Roles of Comparative Law: Inaugural Lecture for the Dan Fenno
Henderson Professorship for East Asian Legal Studies, 73 WASH. L. REV. 25, 36 (1998).
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However, the overall fact remains that the United States, through its now
hundred-year old policy of international engagement, has assisted in creating a
world-wide community premised on increasing global cooperation and
integration. Through its conduct, the United States has, in large part, reaped the
benefits of this participation, while other countries might not feel the same
way. But “participat[ion] in a community over many years . . . creat[es] . . . a
sense of entitlement to some benefits of community membership and a moral
obligation based on . . . reasonable expectations.”203 In other words, an
international system (including its legal component) largely shaped by the
United States imposes a major responsibility on its creator to be receptive to
the ideas originating from other countries that could help the operation of that
system.
If all other reasons fail to convince, “[a]t the very least . . . American
judges should write . . . decisions with a conscious awareness that decisions
from abroad, if considered, might complicate and challenge our analyses.”204
As observed by Justice L’Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada, “[i]f
we continue to learn from each other, we as judges, lawyers, and scholars will
contribute in the best possible way to the advancement not only of human
rights but to the pursuit of justice itself, wherever we are.”205
III. PAST REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Having identified the possible sources of international law that can be used
as an aid to interpret the U.S. Constitution, and having posited several
normative theories on which the comparative enterprise relies, it becomes
incumbent in proposing a methodology for the appropriate selection of
international law within the context of constitutional interpretation, to take a
brief look as to what the U.S. Supreme Court has done lately in the matter.
Because this Article proposes a methodology to be employed prospectively,
only the most recent examples of the Court’s use of international law are

203 Gerald P. Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy,
28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 696 (1981) (referring to Mexican immigrants’ participation in the community life of the
United States (with the tacit approval of the official domestic authorities)).
204 Abramson & Fischer, supra note 103, at 284–85, 287 (stating that consultation of foreign law leads to
a deeper understanding; comparing such law to “superstar amicus briefs” in that foreign decisions offer
otherwise unavailable viewpoints from the world’s best legal minds).
205 L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 88, at 40.
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relevant to the discussion. Moreover, other articles have already given detailed
historical accounts of the use of foreign and international law in this context.206
Some recent members of the U.S. Supreme Court have not demonstrated
much reticence in their willingness to consult international law as an aid to
constitutional interpretation. Because of the high-profile cases where these
references have occurred, these forays have been keenly noticed.207 Some
Justices have also spoken about this practice off the bench. Justice Ginsburg,
for example, in two recent articles, decried the “island” or “lone ranger”
mentality that sometimes infects domestic jurists and noted that “[w]e are the
losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others.”208
Similarly, Justice O’Connor indicated that she was in favor of the U.S.
Supreme Court citing decisions of the European Court of Justice.209
The recent attention paid to this particular use of international law, while
important qualitatively, has not borne fruit in any quantitative manner. In other
words, while the comparative use of international law has occurred in
extremely contentious and highly visible cases, the total sample of recent cases
where the Court has called upon international law as persuasive authority is
quite small.210 Moreover, in those select instances when the Court has opined
on a constitutional provision by seeking insight from materials originating
outside the United States, those materials have overwhelmingly been from
foreign individual states, rather than international law.211 In fact, most often,
international law is given an undifferentiated and uncontextualized treatment

206 See, e.g., Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2; see also Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13,
at 361–87.
207 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20 ETHICS &
INT’L AFF. 477, 478 (2006).
208 Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 1, 8; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond our Borders: The
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 329
(2004).
209 See Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices See Joint Issues with the EU, WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24.
210 See generally Mark V. Tushnet, Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: An
Episode in the Culture Wars, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 299 (2006) (outlining the limited use of international and
foreign law in Supreme Court opinions).
211 E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (pointing out that the United States is the only
country that gives official sanction to the juvenile death penalty, making several comparisons to foreign and
international law); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815, 830 n.34 (1988) (referring to Anglo-American
and Western European legal traditions, in deciding a death-penalty appeal while only referencing international
law in a footnote).
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by being thrown in with foreign domestic law.212 Thus, from within the small
sample of cases that do persuasively rely on foreign and international law, the
international law component represents a minority within a minority. Bradley
has remarked that “[t]he Court has treated . . . international materials as
evidence that may be relevant to the interpretation of vague or uncertain
constitutional provisions.”213 This observation, while necessarily accurate,
does not go very far in explaining either the normative foundation of such use,
or a methodological grounding in this context. As is discussed below, the
inability to make more profound generalizations about the Court’s current use
of international law as a constitutional interpretative aid is more a result of the
Court’s rather ad hoc approach, then a failure of the commentators to spot a
substantial theoretical trend.
A. Eighth Amendment Cases
Probably the most frequent use of international law as persuasive authority
comes within the ambit of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. This is because,
from the dawn of modern cruel-and-unusual-punishment doctrine, “[t]he
climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular
punishment” has been a “not irrelevant” part of the analysis.214 Indeed, the
Court has repeatedly noted that that it has “recognized the relevance of the
views of the international community” to determine whether a particular form
of punishment comports with the contemporary understanding of the Eighth
Amendment.215 This foray into the realm of non-U.S. authority stems from the
framing of the analysis of Eighth Amendment claims which are evaluated with
an eye to “evolving standards of decency” that are the hallmarks of “a
maturing society.”216 As such, the Court has continuously opined that such
standards take into account international opinion and therefore, by “society,” it
is intended “all humanity” rather than a more insular American outlook.
From that vantage point, several modern cases interpreting the confines of
the Eighth Amendment reference international materials—albeit most do so
212 See BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 6–7 (2001) (arguing that international law should be seen as a
separate and distinct legal system, and that the myth that international law can be grouped with domestic law
in a given state should be dispelled).
213 Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV.
59, 93.
214 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596
n.10 (1977)).
215 See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958)).
216 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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without much contextualizing and so scantily that but for scathing dissents that
draw attention to them, they would hardly be noticed. Thus, in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, where the Court ruled that the death penalty was an
unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to persons who
were under the age of sixteen when they perpetrated their crime, the Court, in a
footnote, noted that “three major human rights treaties explicitly prohibit
juvenile death penalties.”217 The three treaties that the Court then referred to
were the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),218
the American Convention on Human Rights,219 and the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War.220
The only analysis by the Court, if it can be characterized as such, in citing
these treaties was to note whether they were signed or ratified by the United
States, and to characterize them as “major.” Both of these considerations are
the tips of the iceberg of very important methodological approaches to the
persuasive use of international law within the context of constitutional
interpretation and offer tiny snippets into the Court’s thinking on the matter.
However, only a psychic can truly know what the Court was attempting to
convey with the notations of signing or ratification of the treaties and their
description as “major.” Nevertheless, the notion of some form of imprimatur
by the United States of an international treaty relates to the expressed opinion
of some part of the U.S. government of which the Court should take
account.221 The identification of the three treaties as “major” is presumptively
an attempt to encapsulate in one word the notion that these treaties represent a
wide consensus within the international community and therefore portray a
positive established norm.222
In the next case to tackle the juvenile death penalty, this time as applied to
those who had committed their crime under the age of eighteen, the Court
reached the opposite conclusion—such sentences were constitutional. In
Stanford v. Kentucky,223 it was primarily the dissent that drew on international
217

See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 n.34.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16,
1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
219 American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
220 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 68, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
221 This aspect will be discussed in further detail in Part IV.B.3, infra.
222 This aspect will be discussed in further detail in Part IV.B.2, infra.
223 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
218
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materials in its attempt to buttress the majority’s argument. In fact, the dissent
reiterated almost verbatim the illustrative footnote of Thompson by stating that
“In addition to national laws, three leading human rights treaties ratified or
signed by the United States explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.”224 In
addition to the three treaties identified by Thompson, the Stanford dissent also
added a resolution to the same effect that had been passed by the UN
Economic and Social Council, endorsed by the General Assembly of the UN,
and adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.225 Although the Court, as it usually
does in these circumstances, offered no contextual reasoning for why it was
calling upon that particular source of international law, the addition of the
resolution is particularly interesting. This is because the resolution is not a
treaty, nor does it arguably rise to the level of customary law, and therefore
represents an example of international law of the soft law variety. Its
interpolation in the dissent’s opinion might indicate that the prohibition on
sentencing juveniles to death, while not necessarily an established norm of
international law, is an emerging global norm to which the United States
should subscribe.226
The most recent expostulations on the applicability of the Eighth
Amendment to two different types of punishments also contain the most
developed uses of international law as applied to juveniles.227 In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court overruled Stanford and declared that the execution of
individuals who had committed their crimes under the age of eighteen was an
unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment.228 In a section devoted
entirely to the persuasive use of foreign and international law, the majority
opinion cited favorably the same treaties identified in the Thompson majority
224

Id. at 389–90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 390 n.10 (noting that the resolution included the safeguard that “[p]ersons below 18 years of
age at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be sentenced to death”).
226 This aspect will be discussed in further detail in Part IV.B.2, infra.
227 Between Stanford and the two next cases about to be discussed, there were other examples of the use
of international law similar in quantity and quality to those illustrated in Thompson and Stanford. In Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), relying in part on international authority, the Court ruled that it was
unconstitutional to execute a person who was mentally challenged. Id. at 321. And in Knight v. Florida, 528
U.S. 990 (1999) (denying petition for certiorari), Justice Breyer dissented from the denial of certiorari in a case
which presented the issue of whether a long delay between sentencing a person to death, and the execution of
that sentence, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 993 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). In arguing that the Court should review the case on its merits, Justice Breyer referenced the
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. See id. at 994.
228 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 579 (2005).
225
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and Stanford dissent and added to them the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.229
The separate dissent authored by Justice O’Connor is noteworthy because,
notwithstanding the fact that she disagreed with the outcome reached by the
majority, she wrote separately from the other dissenters to confirm that foreign
and international law have a role in Eighth Amendment analysis, because the
inquiry required in this context “reflects the special character of the Eighth
Amendment, which, as the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly
from the maturing values of civilized society.”230 Justice Scalia’s dissent
reiterates his usual creed against using international law to interpret any part of
the U.S. Constitution, but is very interesting for its prescience.231 In referring
to the majority’s use of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Justice
Scalia noted that the treaty “prohibits punishing [children] with life in prison
without the possibility of release,” and added that “get[ting] in line with the
international community” would surely mean adopting that section of the
treaty as well—a proposition that Justice Scalia characterized as giving “little
comfort.”232
Justice Scalia’s prediction was of an accuracy that would have made
Nostradamus proud. Merely five years after the decision in Roper, the Court
decided Graham v. Florida, and held that the punishment of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for juveniles who had not committed murder
was an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment.233 The majority
cited exactly the same article of the same treaty that Justice Scalia had
identified five years earlier, stating that this treaty prohibited the imposition of
“life imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed by
persons below eighteen years of age.”234 Even though the majority noted that
there was “no international legal agreement that is binding on the United
States,” that prohibited “life without parole for juvenile offenders,” it went on
to assert that such a fact missed the mark because the inquiry is not about the
binding (or not binding) nature of international law, but rather whether the
229 See id. at 575–77; see also Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child, entered into force Nov. 29, 1999, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49; Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
230 Roper, 543 U.S. at 604–05 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
231 See id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 623. Justice Scalia also consulted international law in the negative by pointing out several
examples of laws that were not consonant with the U.S. legal system, and thus decrying the supposed selective
nature of the Court’s consultations with such law. See id. at 624–27.
233 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
234 Id. at 2034.
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punishment being examined by the Court comports with its contemporary
understanding of the Eighth Amendment.235 In the Graham case, such
punishment did not.
Taken together, Roper and Graham represent the high point of the use of
international law as persuasive authority within the context of Eighth
Amendment cruel-and-unusual punishment analysis. Both cases devote more
length to the use of foreign and international authority than any of their
predecessors (albeit the “foreign” part is significantly longer than the
“international” part). And qualitatively, the analyses also reflect a deeper
analytical focus than do many of the cases that also deploy this comparative
methodology. Thus, both Roper and Graham offer a comprehensive
introduction into the reasoning of the Court for embarking on its international
voyage: that the United States is part of a community of nations in which it
should share, from a normative standpoint, a certain commonality when it
comes to how it treats its convicted criminals. Similarly, both cases do not
select obscure notions of international doctrine, but well-known treaties that
form the backbone of contemporary international law. Moreover, both cases
reiterate the normative comparative ethos that international law is there to
serve as a method of persuasion, and not one of forced compliance.
B. Other Cases
Before turning to the proposed framework for the selection of international
law, it is worth examining two recent forays by the Supreme Court into the
persuasive use of international law in cases that did not involve the Eighth
Amendment. While, as noted above, the framing of modern Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is a natural fit for the use of international law, other
U.S. constitutional doctrines might not be so amenable to this interpretative
methodology. Nevertheless, the Court throughout history has used
international law to interpret other constitutional provisions, with a particular
focus on the Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses.236 This is
because, like the standards announced for the Eighth Amendment, the Equal
Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses embody norms such as
235

Id. Justice Thomas, in dissent, confined his rejection of the use of international law in this context to a
footnote noting correctly that his objection to this practice had been adequately explained in previous cases
delineating the contours of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 2053 n.12 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
236 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 n.3 (1937) (looking to status of compulsory selfincrimination in continental Europe); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908) (looking to European
labor laws in post-Lochner Due Process case).
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fairness and liberty “that transcend[] borders,” and therefore lend themselves to
a certain universality of approach.237 Indeed, Substantive Due Process analysis
tracks somewhat that of the Eighth Amendment by seeking to protect those
practices that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”238 Justice Scalia,
albeit mockingly and disapprovingly, made a similar point when attempting to
counter Justice O’Connor’s approval of the use of international law within the
context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that she characterized as having a
“distinctive character” that made it especially adept to the use of such non-U.S.
authority, by noting that “[n]othing in the text [of the Eighth Amendment]
reflects such a distinctive character—and [the Court has] certainly applied the
‘maturing values’ rationale to give brave new meaning to other provisions of
the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause.”239 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s yearning for the jettison of
“maturing values” jurisprudence that links the Eighth Amendment to the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, it does not appear that the Court is intent on
abandoning this form of analysis at least within these specific constitutional
contexts.
The most recent persuasive reliance on international law in the context of
an equal protection case came in Grutter v. Bollinger,240 where the Court
upheld The University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action
program.241 In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg noted that the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women both supported the proposition that affirmative action programs are
remedial in nature and must be reviewed periodically so that they can be
phased out once the goals of equality have been fulfilled.242 No real reason for
the consultation with these two international treaties was given, nor was any
qualification other than the notation that the first of these two treaties was
ratified by the United States.
A fuller use of international law occurred in Lawrence v. Texas.243 In
Lawrence, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that criminalized the sexual

237
238
239
240
241
242
243

See Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 382.
Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 n.9 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id. at 343.
See id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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conduct of two consenting adults of the same sex as being an unconstitutional
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.244 The
international law references came in rebuttal to the arguments made in the case
Lawrence was overruling, Bowers v. Hardwick,245 where Chief Justice Burger,
in a concurrence, noted that sodomy was universally condemned and
criminalized in all Judeo-Christian Western civilizations.246 Justice Kennedy,
in Lawrence, drew on international law to debunk Chief Justice Burger’s
claim, in Bowers, specifically by noting that a case decided by the European
Court of Human Rights five full years before Bowers, which presented the
identical legal question as Bowers, had reached the exact opposite result of that
which Chief Justice Burger declaimed, to universal approval.247
While Justice Ginsburg in Grutter provides only a scintilla of context to her
citation of international authority, Justice Kennedy gives us substantial insight
into the motivation behind his citations to non-U.S. opinions. In Lawrence,
international law (of the regional law variety) provided a communing function
of linking the U.S. Constitution to the European Convention of Human Rights
as well as a counter to the obviously erroneous arguments uttered by Chief
Justice Burger in Bowers.248 For the Lawrence majority, it was not enough to
merely rule in favor of the petitioners, but they had to clarify that Bowers was
being unceremoniously dumped as a colossal error from its inception.249 This
could not be clearer in the words of Justice Kennedy: “Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”250 International law was thus
used as a universal battering ram to demonstrate the magnitude of Bowers’s
error.
Notwithstanding the clear motivation of the use of international law in
some of the cases illustrated above, there are key aspects of the use of
international law exhibited in the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection,
and Substantive Due Process contexts that raise more questions than answers.
First, what is the point in noting frequently whether the United States has
244

Id. at 578–79.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
246 Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
247 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (“[T]he decision [of the European Court of Human Rights] is at odds
with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.”).
248 Id. at 576–77 (citing European Court of Human Rights decisions rejecting Bowers and stating that the
right of homosexuals to engage “in intimate, consensual conduct” is an “integral part of human freedom”).
249 Id. at 576 (“In the United States criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving
of its reasoning in all respects . . . .”).
250 Id. at 578.
245
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signed or ratified a particular treaty to which the Court is referring? Does
failure of the United States to ratify a treaty signal a dereliction of the duty of
the United States that the Court should rectify or does it convey the exact
opposite—that the United States purposely seeks to oppose the substance of
that treaty? Second, why is it important for the Court to predominantly refer to
international law that is encapsulated in large well-known multilateral treaties?
Is it to convince itself of the sound policy grounding of such law (thus
implying that international law of a murkier provenance might not be
perceived as persuasive enough) or is the Court more concerned with
highlighting the perceived universality of the same? And last, is the Court’s
use of international law to be implied as occurring within a framework of
repeated interactions—in other words, as part of an ongoing worldwide process
of customary international law formation? These are the questions (and some
others) that a methodological theory for the use of international law must
answer.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
One thing that can be glimpsed from the Court’s use of international law as
persuasive authority is that such use is usually called upon in what most
commentators would characterize as “big” cases. This observation might not
be as flip as it sounds because one theory could be that the more important and
far-reaching from a constitutional, theoretical, and practical perspective the
outcome might be, the more vital it becomes to consult as much relevant
persuasive authority as is necessary to be assured of a correct result. Justice
Kennedy hinted at such reasoning in Lawrence when he justified consultation
to international materials by noting that the issue in that case involved “values
[that are] share[d] with a wider civilization.”251
But a methodological theory based on the relative importance of a
particular case seems at best haphazard, and at worst self-serving. Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized both of these notions observing that in a whole slew of
cases where the Court cited international law to interpret the U.S. Constitution,
it had “offered no explanation for its own citation[s]” and therefore this lacuna
cast a serious doubt about the whole enterprise that he suggested ought to be
abandoned outright.252 Clearly, something else is required to give a sounder
251

Id. at 576.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority opinion held
that the imposition of the death penalty on those who were mentally challenged was an unconstitutional
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 321 (majority opinion).
252
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normative and methodological strength to this endeavor that can be of service
to the members of the high court. After all, when all is said and done about the
use of international law, “the task of interpreting [constitutional provisions]
remains [the Court’s] responsibility.”253
A. A Note on Foreign Law
It bears repeating that international law is clearly not the only repository of
non-U.S. law that can function as an aid to U.S. constitutional interpretation.
Foreign law, being the domestic law of other countries, can and does function
in a similar role as international law. Indeed, as noted above, the Court cites to
both sources seemingly interchangeably and citations to foreign law are
substantially more frequent and detailed than those to international law—the
latter, in most circumstances, ostensibly appearing as afterthoughts. In other
words, foreign and international law are not usually selected nor treated
independently of one another within the context of constitutional
interpretation.254 But foreign domestic law is inherently different from
international law and its structural differences should, from both a normative
and practical perspective, be treated differently than international law. These
differences ought to be reflected not only in the motivations that go into
whether such law should be selected,255 but also how that particular law is
selected.
In a previous article, this Author approached the question of methodology
of selection as applied to foreign law only. In it, this Author identified three
criteria that courts should take into consideration when seeking to consult
foreign law in the context of domestic constitutional adjudication: (1) the
democratic credentials of the nation from which the law is being sought with a
marked preference for those nations whose law is processed from a system of
253

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
That is not to say that other parties have not already urged the Court to find a purposeful link between
the foreign law and the international law it cites. For example, in its amicus brief filed in support of the
petitioners in Lawrence, Amnesty International noted that both foreign law and international law were
perfectly integrated on the matter of the criminalization of consensual adult same-sex activities. See Brief for
Mary Robinson of Amnesty International et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02–102), 2003 WL 164151, at *12–13 (specifying that the South African
Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights, and the UN Human Rights Committee all had
reached a common understanding of privacy rights that encompassed the idea of non-interference into the
sexual practices of same-sex consulting adults).
255 See, e.g., Glensy, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 1178 (discussing the considerations
that should cause foreign law and international law to be treated differently within the context of constitutional
adjudication).
254
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checks and balances that owes its ultimate source of legitimacy to the people;
(2) the societal character and culture of the nation from where the proposed
law is coming with an eye towards spotting those embedded socio-cultural
features that create a commonality between that nation and the United States;
and (3) the specific context of the case where the inquiry is into the nature of
the doctrine being examined by the Court and whether it shares characteristics
that transcend national borders.256
While the above criteria prove workable and very effective in identifying
countries from where law can be consulted as persuasive authority as an aid to
U.S. constitutional interpretation,257 they prove less useful within the context
of international law. The reasons for this are multiple. First, it is difficult to
evaluate the process of production of international law from a democratic
perspective. There are certain characteristics of international law that appear
democratic, but others are decisively not. On the more democratic side are
notions that international bodies that promulgate international law only enact
such rules when a majority or supermajority of nations agree. Similarly, the
process of production of the basic forms of international law are superficially
democratic in that bilateral or multilateral treaties are only entered into by
consent of the participant nations without coercion, and customary
international law is democratic in the sense that it requires a quasi-unanimous
organic adherence before a rule ripens into binding status.
However, on the other side of the equation is the fact that not all of the
process of international lawmaking is democratic. Even though international
law is premised on a notion of juridical equality of all nations,258 in practice,
this is a fallacy. For example, the UN Security Council (the chief executive
lawmaking body of the UN) functions on an extremely undemocratic model
where five nations (who are permanent members of the fifteen nation body)
each possess a veto right on any action that the Council could take.259 The UN
General Assembly, putatively more democratic, passes resolutions that are
256

See Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 361.
The criteria do not ignore countries that have a particular outlying jurisprudence in particular areas of
the law for specific historical or cultural reasons. Thus, the German restrictions on Nazi symbols and abortion
must be viewed in light of the wild abuses of human rights carried out by the Third Reich; the tradition of
French secularism must be appreciated in light of the causes of its revolution; the goal of total egalitarianism in
democratic South Africa is a response to the vile apartheid regime that preceded the current constitutional
structure; and the treatment of indigenous people in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all
reflect the specific historical relationships between the native populations and the respective governments.
258 BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 52.
259 U.N. Charter arts. 23, 27.
257
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non-binding at their inception but that could ripen into customary international
law, but it is not truly democratic in the sense that China and India (with well
more than one billion people each) have the same number of votes as countries
such as Vanuatu or Tuvalu (Pacific atolls with only tens of thousands of
people).260 Moreover, many international bodies with law making capabilities
are comprised of countries that have no democratic credentials themselves.261
Indeed, it is rare to have international bodies whose total membership are
committed to democratic governance such as the European Court of Human
Rights—“a body that derives its authority and jurisdiction via the consent of
nations, all of which exhibit democratic characteristics.”262 Nevertheless,
regardless of the composition of international bodies and their members’ lack
of adherence to democratic principles, the promulgation of international law
from these sources is valid as is the substance of those rules. Therefore, unlike
foreign law, an examination of democratic credentials does not yield anything
useful to a court seeking to use international law as a source of persuasive
authority.
Socio-cultural commonalities are equally not useful when searching for
appropriate international law to use as an aid to constitutional interpretation.
While international law might be said to reflect a certain legal culture
(although legal culture is only part of the composite of elements that
constitutes the totality of a nation’s “culture”),263 it is difficult to conceive what
kind of society international law represents, if any.264 Therefore, aside from the
specific context of the case (which is a factor equally applicable to foreign law
and international law)265 the other two criteria offered for selection of foreign
law do not apply to international law. Hence, different parameters should
provide the adequate policy considerations that will form the basis of sound
methodological selection factors.

260

See id. art. 18.
For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit has created an index of democracy, assigning states
values which reflect “the state of democracy worldwide.” Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index
2010, THE ECONOMIST, 1 (Dec. 15, 2010), http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf. The
values range from zero to ten with a higher score reflecting a more democratic state. Three notable world
players scored quite low: North Korea (1.08), Saudi Arabia (1.84), and Iran (1.94). Id. at 7–8. All of these
countries are members of the World Health Organization. Countries, WHO, http://www.who.int/
countries/en (last visited May 2, 2011).
262 Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 444.
263 See id. at 422–24 (analyzing the many component parts of different cultures).
264 Here the concept of “society” is descriptive of present reality rather than normative.
265 See, e.g., Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 433–36 (justifying the use of casespecific context in a determination of applicable foreign and international law sources).
261
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B. The Three-Pronged Analysis
Consultation with international law has been, in one form or another, part
of the fabric of constitutional interpretation in the United States almost since
its naissance. As noted by Justice Breyer, the United States is “a Nation that
from its birth has given a ‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind.’”266
Chief Justice John Jay saw these references to the law of nations (as
international law was known at the time) as a way for the United States to give
itself legitimacy as a newly formed nation. He noted “the United States . . . by
taking a place among the nations of the earth, bec[a]me amenable to the laws
of nations.”267 The role that international law took in the early years of the
Court’s jurisprudence was to function as an advisory backdrop against which
U.S. decisions had to be squared and reconciled, whenever possible. Thus, “the
laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable . . . be construed as to
infract the common principles and usages of nations.”268 As concisely and
famously expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall, “an act of [C]ongress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction” exists.269
While these iterations of the use of international law served a very valid
purpose for the time in which they occurred, they cannot form the basis for a
theory-based methodology for the selection of international law as persuasive
authority. The main reason for this is that the early Court’s proposed role for
international law was completely undifferentiated—that is it was not context
specific, but merely a blanket judicial norm of which the Court, over time,
became barely conscious.270 But a reasoned methodology cannot exist in the
nether recesses of the judicial mind; rather, it must live in the foreground so
there is a cognizance about how it should operate and the possibility of
purposely adapting it to changing situations and circumstances. When coupling
these considerations with a plausible germinating theory a coherent
methodology can emerge.
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Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (denying petition for certiorari).
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
268 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801).
269 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
270 After all, rhetorically speaking, how many cases that the Court has decided since Schooner Charming
Betsy explicitly test the notion whether a particular statutory or constitutional construction comports with, or
deviates from, prevalent international law?
267
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1. International Dimension of the Problem
It is an axiom that international law deals with cross-border affairs. Thus it
comes as no surprise that there are vast bodies of international law in all forms
dealing with topics such as foreign relations, the law of the seas, the
conventions of war and the treatment of prisoners, and trade and tariff rules.
But, as noted above, international law in the last sixty years has addressed
more than extra-national matters but has increasingly concerned the
relationships that a state has with its own citizens within its own borders.
Moreover, even within traditional areas of international law, such as the
substance of the various rights that foreign citizens enjoy when located in a
country of which they are not nationals, norms of casual compliance by the
host state are giving way to more stringent methods of enforcement so that the
impact of international law is felt even in situations where only one sovereign
nation is involved. In summary, the subject matter of international law has
become more pervasive and has infiltrated legal issues which, until recently,
have not had much to do with international law.
Notwithstanding the fact that international law has increased in scope, there
are clearly areas of the law it has not reached yet. As a general matter, there are
many administrative, structural, and procedural legal aspects about which
international law has very little, if anything, to say. So, for example,
international law might be silent as to what type of a challenge a welfare
recipient should be entitled before having her subsidies curtailed by the state,
or there might be nothing in international law that dictates what nutritional
information should be printed on food products, or the jurisdictional overlaps
inherent in a federal system of government might not appear in the annals of
any repository of international law. The fact that international law might speak
loudly to certain subjects but whisper or be mute about others leads to part of
the first consideration that a court seeking to use international law as
persuasive authority to aid in constitutional interpretation should contemplate:
that the problem being presented in the case at hand have some sort of
international dimension to it. In other words, the issue presented to the court
must be of a subject matter that international law covers in some way. This
might seem an obvious exhortation, but in certain past cases where the
Supreme Court consulted international law, there seemed to be no apparent
international connection to the issue being litigated.
However, this is not the end of the equation vis-à-vis the international
dimension of the problem. There is a second part that might not seem as self-
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evident as consulting international law only in those instances where the
subject matter of the controversy is covered by the substantive rules of
international law. The second part of this consideration must account for the
potential international impact of the decision to be taken by the court. This
should be consonant not only with the issue under review, but also with the
normative goals of the comparative enterprise illustrated in Part III above. As
such, any court that tasks itself with consulting international law as persuasive
authority to interpret the U.S. Constitution should only do so after an inquiry
into the international ramifications of its decision.
It should be noted that consultation with international materials in these
instances does not have to lead to a result that conforms with prevalent
international law norms if these norms conflict in an obvious way with the U.S.
Constitution. As noted by Justice Scalia, “[T]he basic premise . . . that
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be
rejected out of hand.”271 As a general rule, Justice Scalia is correct, but of
course the suggestion made by proponents of the persuasive use of
international law is not that international law should be consulted so that
American law can be “conformed” to it, but rather so that any conclusions
reached by the court can be “confirmed” by this body of law. As noted very
recently by Justice Kennedy, the idea that there is an “international consensus”
regarding a particular rule of law to which the United States should be bound
“miss[es] the mark” because the inquiry into the substance of international law
is to provide for “respected and significant confirmation” of the Court’s
conclusions.272
The notion that a court should examine the international impact of its
decisions when referring to international law in the context of constitutional
interpretation is not a novelty within Supreme Court jurisprudence. Several
doctrines currently employed by the Supreme Court embody this ethos of
awareness of international ramifications. Most important of these is comity.273
Comity is a concept mostly pertinent to private international law cases. Comity
is defined as:
[N]either a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and
good will . . . . [b]ut it is the recognition which one nation allows
271 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not distinguish
between international law and foreign law in his exhortation.
272 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).
273 Other doctrines that exhibit the same characteristics are the act of state doctrine and the dormant
foreign relations preemption doctrine. See Glensy, Which Countries Count?, supra note 13, at 394.
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within its territory to the . . . acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
274
laws.

Therefore, comity owes its grounding in a reciprocal norm that forms the root
of many policies underlying the comparative enterprise. Indeed, comity is
often invoked in cases “in the correct adjudication of which foreign nations are
deeply interested . . . [and] in which the principles of the law . . . of nations
often form[s] an essential inquiry.”275 Thus, comity represents “the basis of
international law, a rule of international law, a synonym for private
international law . . . goodwill between sovereigns . . . reciprocity, or
‘considerations of high international politics concerned with maintaining
amicable and workable relationships between nations.’”276
In keeping precepts of comity in mind when deciding cases, the Court
adopts the pragmatist notion on which comity is based. Possibly of even more
importance, the force of comity, like that of international law within the
context of constitutional adjudication, is not one of obligation, but rather one
of counsel.277 Thus, the motivations that lead courts to justify reliance on
notions of comity are similar to those used to justify reliance on international
law within the context of constitutional interpretation. That is not to say that
courts are uniform in their interpretation of the scope of comity. Some courts
have used comity as a nominal starting point of their analysis, only to be
discarded if counteracting policy considerations counsel against its application
in that particular instance.278 Other courts have given the policy more teeth by
noting that it will be employed to avoid retaliatory action in kind by a foreign
state.279 Regardless of the particular treatment that comity is given in a specific

274 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); see also Burley, supra note 191, at 1948 (defining
comity as “a principle grounded not on courtesy but on a conception of the transnational rule of law”).
275 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816).
276 Paul, supra note 192, at 3–4 (footnotes omitted).
277 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64 (stating that comity is neither absolute obligation, nor mere courtesy); see
also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–98 (1993) (holding that comity would not counsel
against exercising jurisdiction in an action affecting foreign insurers for violations of the Sherman Act).
278 See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428–30 (7th Cir. 1993)
(upholding the injunction of foreign proceedings on the ground of putative incompetence of the foreign body
notwithstanding contrary policy considerations supported by comity); Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d
624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing to require district courts “to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion
of comity” when issuing anti-suit injunctions against foreign proceedings).
279 See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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case, the point is that courts are adept in exploring the international
ramifications of a legal decision.
The possible international implications of the Court’s decisions have
played a major role in significant constitutional law cases where international
law served as a persuasive source of law (whether the Court majority decided
to adhere to it or not).280 Of utmost import is United States v. AlvarezMachain,281 where the Court decided that federal courts had jurisdiction to try
a Mexican national who had been kidnapped and tendered to the United States
by American law enforcement officers.282 The dissent, although rooting its
argument in the proper interpretation of the Mexican-American extradition
treaty, expressed grave concern regarding the effect that the Court’s majority
opinion would have across the border.283 In very strong words, Justice Stevens
concluded that he suspected that “most courts throughout the civilized
world . . . [would] be deeply disturbed by the ‘monstrous’ decision the Court
announce[d]. . . . For every nation that has an interest in preserving the Rule of
Law is affected . . . by a decision of this character.”284
The dissent in Alvarez-Machain is noteworthy. The most important reason
for this is the fact that Justice Stevens derives the normative strength of his
argument not from the U.S. government’s breach of the Mexican-American
extradition treaty (which was irrefutable) but instead from the potential parade
of international horrors that he envisages should the Court ratify the act of
banditry at issue in the case.285 After all, how happy would U.S. officials be if
foreign undercover government agents were to kidnap an American national in
the United States, shuttle him abroad, and then try him in a foreign land? Thus,
by examining the impact on other countries of the Court’s decision, Justice
Stevens squarely reconciled the legal argument with its practical implications
280

A series of cases in which international ramifications played an important role in the arguments and
decisions of the various courts that opined on the matter were related to U.S. states’ continual violation of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which mandates that signatory nations notify a person undergoing
arrest procedures as quickly as is feasible of her right to assistance from her consulate. MICHAEL J. GARCIA,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32390, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: OVERVIEW OF U.S.
IMPLEMENTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS 3–10 (2004). Because these cases address, at least in part, matters that are properly of binding
international law and its impact on the U.S. constitutional system, they are only tangentially relevant to the
discussion at hand. Id. at 6.
281 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
282 Id. at 657.
283 Id. at 687–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284 Id.
285 Id.
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and exhorted the Court to factor this latter variable into its decision. The
international ramifications adduced in Alvarez-Machain were a natural
outgrowth of the particular type of claim that was litigated in that case. In other
words, some types of cases inherently lend themselves quite organically to the
consultation of international law. But not all cases that present international
ramifications can emerge even in cases that are, strictly speaking, purely
domestic and therefore extrinsic to the specific issue being disputed. For
example, a case presenting a constitutional issue stemming from a criminal
conviction might have international reach if the criminal defendant is a foreign
national, or if the possible sentence to be meted out in that case violates certain
international norms that might form the basis of a retaliatory action by
countries supporting such norms.286 Similarly, international ramifications
might result from a case presenting purely a domestic issue of law but where
the most noteworthy and influential precedent is international and courts all
around the world are following that international precedent.287 These
illustrations represent only the tip of the iceberg of situations that might arise
that could trigger a constitutional law issue, the resolution of which may well
ripple beyond the U.S. border.
In summary, the first step that a court should undertake when deciding
whether to consult with international law as an aid to constitutional
interpretation is to determine whether the problem has an international
dimension. This is a two-step analysis: first, and rather obviously, the court
should ascertain whether the subject matter of the dispute is of the nature to
which international law speaks. In a second and more complex step, the court
should determine whether the consequences of the decision reached have any
international ramifications. As illustrated above, the Court is familiar with the
latter inquiry that forms the part of various doctrines that often come up in its
jurisprudence—comity being the most important example. Once this threshold
286 An example of this is the European Union rule that refuses extradition of any person to a country
where that person could be subjected to the death penalty. Agreement on Extradition Between the European
Union and the United States of America, U.S.–E.U., art. 13, July 19, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-14
(2006). Of course, this does not mean that a U.S. court should declare the death penalty unconstitutional
because of the European Union rule, but merely that it should be cognizant that the resolution of a specific
case might impact these international norms.
287 This was the case in Lawrence, where the Dudgeon decision rendered by the European Court of
Human Rights, characterized as “the world’s most influential human rights court,” was contrary to U.S. law,
and it was that U.S. law that was being rejected world over, creating not negligible reputational problems for
the United States in international settings. See Brief for Mary Robinson, Amnesty International et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02–102), 2003 WL 164151, at
*10–11.
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inquiry is made, the Court should consider two other elements to determine the
appropriateness of relying on a particular rule of international law.
2. Status of Law
Like domestic law, international law is constantly undergoing births,
deaths, rebirths, transformations, and mutations of all shapes and sizes. There
has been, and continues to be, a very vigorous debate amongst international
tribunals, organizations, institutions, scholars, governments, lawyers, and
activists about the substantive content of international law and its scope, reach,
and enforcement both on a transnational and domestic level.288 As with many
similar debates, there are major areas of agreement around which a large
majority of the various players in the international system have coalesced, but
there are major areas of disagreement around which, at least for the present,
there is a lack of unity. The areas of agreement and disagreement can be of
various sorts; so, for example, the international community might concur that
certain rules that began as mere custom have now ripened into binding
customary international law, or there might be considerable unresolved debate
about the enforcement mechanisms to be deployed against a state that has
signed and ratified, but then violated, an important multilateral treaty. To
synthesize, international law is in a constant state of flux and contest, and a
court that seeks to use it as an aid to domestic constitutional interpretation must
be aware of this fact.
The fact that the substantive and procedural rules of international law are
being constantly rewritten is an important consideration for courts to bear in
mind when seeking to use international law persuasively. However, and more
importantly, that knowledge must be supplemented by proper rules of
recognition that are able to determine the status and force of a particular rule of
international law. In other words, not all rules of international law have the
same status, and an appreciation of which rules hold most (or least) sway
should be a factor the court considers in determining how persuasive a rule of
international law should be. From this perspective, it is possible to divide
international law rules into three distinct categories, using as the dividing
criteria the level of concordance about the existence and strength of these rules
amongst the international community. Thus, the court seeking to use
international law as persuasive authority should first ascertain whether that law

288

See BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 6–12.
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reflects a settled norm of international law, a contested norm of international
law, or an emerging norm of international law.
Settled norms of international law represent those substantive rules that
enjoy the highest level of support and adherence among players in the
international system. Virtual unanimity (or, at the very least, an extremely high
consensus) must exist between nations around the globe for an international
norm to be considered “settled.”289 As a result of their almost unimpeachable
status within the framework of international law, the use of settled norms
within the ambit of constitutional interpretation would carry substantial weight
and significant persuasive value. Here, the comparative policy being served is
not conformity for conformity’s sake but it is instead a normative evaluation of
the fact that there must be important motivations behind a position of
international law that nations of diverse cultures and backgrounds have
concluded deserve respect and universal compliance. Therefore, within the
context of constitutional interpretation, settled norms of international law
should be given an elevated level of persuasive effect.
So how does a court identify that these international norms are settled
(rather than contested or emerging) and thus universal? There are several
possible avenues that one can take to conclude that an international norm is
settled, and much will depend on how broadly one wants to define “settled.”
Under the narrowest possible definition, settled norms of international law will
correlate very closely to peremptory norms (jus cogens). As noted in Part II
above, a peremptory norm is a fundamental tenet of international law that is
approved by the international community of nations as a rule from which no
waiver can ever be permitted. It bears reiterating that, while there is not much
agreement as to which norms have reached that status or how they have done
so, there is considerable agreement that norms such as the prohibition of
slavery, genocide, piracy, and torture are all jus cogens.290 Taking the last as an
example, a ban on torture can be validated as jus cogens by examining the
numerous international treaties that ban it (among others, the Geneva
Conventions291), the universal nature of such treaties (having been signed and
ratified by almost every nation around the globe), the expressed opprobrium
289

Id. at 25.
See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: ‘Jus Cogens’ and ‘Obligatio Erga Omnes,’ LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 63.
291 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
290
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against the practice by government officials of most countries, the absence of
any accepted legal argument in opposition to its status as a peremptory norm,
and the legal arguments made in cases where such a practice is imputed.292
Moreover, judicial decisions have declared that torture “violates established
norms of the international law of human rights”—a clear assertion of the
existence of a settled international norm on the subject.293
Under a broader definition of “settled norm,” other international rules could
be classified as “settled” beyond the narrow categorization of jus cogens. Here,
the examination is the same as that described in the paragraph above, but a
finding of a peremptory norm would not be necessary to define a settled
international norm. The normative reason for the broadened definition of
“settled norm” is that the purpose for categorizing international rules as
“settled” is different than the purpose of finding a particular international norm
to be peremptory: in the first case, evidence of a norm being settled is used as a
strong persuasive indicator of what the proper interpretation of a specific U.S.
constitutional provision should be, while in the second case, the reason to find
an international rule to be jus cogens is to bind nations to it without
exception.294 Clearly, the threshold inquiry in the latter case should be far
higher than in the former, because any findings within the context of
constitutional interpretation are never binding onto U.S. courts. The type of
issue before the court might function as an indicator as to the level of
consensus international law should have before the court deems it valid enough
for consultation. As stated by the Court, in cases pertaining to “the express
affirmation of certain fundamental rights,” a settled norm of international law
would “simply underscore[] the centrality of those same rights within our own
heritage of freedom.”295 In these instances, international rules such as the
prohibition on executing persons who committed crimes while juveniles should
acquire the status of settled international norm for the same reasons given
292 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated that torture is a
peremptory international norm and all countries are mandated “to investigate, prosecute and punish”
individuals accused of torture because “the torturer has become, like the pirate and the slave trader before him,
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.” Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T at 55–56
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
293 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
294 In his majority opinion in Graham, Justice Kennedy made this exact point by noting that whether a
settled norm of international law is jus cogens or not is “of no import” because the strength of international law
in the context of constitutional interpretation is not contingent on “those norms [being] binding” but on its
ability to establish a denominator for “basic principles of decency.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027
(2010).
295 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005).
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above for torture. In addition, even though the prohibition of the practice might
not rise to the level of peremptory norm, its sheer unusualness in the
international community contributes to the notion that it is something that the
vast majority of the international community finds repugnant.296
There does not seem to be much normative force to the argument that the
U.S. Constitution should be interpreted in a way that is contrary to settled
norms of international law, so long as the constitutional provision being
examined can be rationally and reasonably interpreted to be consonant with
such norms. Aside from the tired refrain of preservation of sovereignty uttered
by critics of this sort of use of international law (which applies to the
comparative enterprise across the board and not just to international law in
particular), it is hard to imagine anyone seriously advocating that genocide or
torture are somehow permitted by the U.S. Constitution.297 Settled
international norms therefore represent the strongest iteration of international
law and are most normatively persuasive within the context of constitutional
interpretation.298
On the other hand, contested norms represent the intermediate echelon of
rules as they pertain to their level of observance and enforcement by the
international community. Contested norms of international law are recognized
and practiced by a significant majority or plurality of international actors but
are nonetheless opposed by a non-negligible number within the various

296 This means that the determination that a practice violates a peremptory norm of international law,
while instructive, is not critical to the determination of whether such practice is contrary to settled norms of
international law. Thus, for example, in Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 (2002), the petitioner argued before the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights that his death sentence in Nevada for a crime that he committed when a juvenile
should be overturned on the grounds that such a punishment contravened a peremptory norm of international
law. Id. ¶ 113. Over the objections of the United States, the Commission agreed. See id. ¶ 115. Nevertheless,
in Roper, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared those punishments as applied to juveniles unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment, they did not do so on the ground that such punishments violated jus cogens (a
fact that is still debatable notwithstanding the holding in Domingues) with which the United States would have
to comply, but rather because of the persuasive weight of international law based on the reasoning that
prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders had, by the time Roper was decided, become settled
international law. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–79.
297 Disturbingly, Justice Scalia states that an international consensus on such matters can be shown to be
unreasonable by contrary U.S. law. See id. at 627 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298 In her dissent in Roper, Justice O’Connor implied that settled norms of international law found in
treaties were the only rules that she was prepared to use as an aid for constitutional interpretation. See id. at
605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In rejecting that international law advised against the execution of minors,
Justice O’Conner noted that the congruence of domestic and international law that she was seeking ought to be
only found in “clear agreement-expressed” forms. See id.
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international regimes.299 Their status as “contested” stems from the fact that
these norms are often the subject matter of heated debate in the international
community—such debate being ongoing at the time that a court interpreting
the U.S. Constitution calls upon them as a source of persuasive authority.300
Therefore, in general terms, they should not carry as much persuasive weight
as settled norms of international law.
Clearly, there are superficially stronger arguments against the persuasive
use of contested norms of international law than there are for a similar use of
settled norms. Contested norms, by their nature, are not universally accepted
by the international community; therefore, why should the United States utilize
international norms of ambiguous provenance to interpret its own
Constitution? The policies served by using contested norms of international
law as persuasive authority are somewhat different than those applicable to a
similar use of settled norms, but these policies are nonetheless important and
carry a dual purpose. First, the United States, by domestically adopting a
contested norm as a constitutional requirement, may signal to the rest of the
world that it is taking a particular side in the contest. Because the opinion of
the United States carries a lot of weight, by so acting, the United States could
be seen as a norm entrepreneur and provide guidance to other nations (which
might have been reticent up to that point to state their position), to adopt a
similar rule. In this context, the United States is attempting to push a contested
norm into the category of settled norm. Secondly, the signal sent by the United
States in adopting the contested norm might also be expressive and associative
in value. Under this reading, it would be valuable for the Court to engage in an
inquiry into which nations had already expressed their favor for the contested
norm. If these were nations with which there were commonalities of purpose,
entering the fray on that particular side would express the desire of the United
States to be counted as part of that side of the argument with all the
reputational enhancements that might entail.
The method of recognizing contested norms in many ways resembles that
illustrated above for settled norms (whether peremptory or not). However,
there are added circumstances that need to be examined for contested norms. In
particular, the international law of regional organizations can be an area where
contested norms of international law lie. Because the contest regarding the
status of international law often pits one region of the world against another for
299
300

See BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 20.
See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
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social, cultural, and historical reasons, a simple analysis of the output of world
bodies might overlook the important activity being conducted by regional
institutions on this front. Similarly, contested norms of international law
(unlike peremptory norms) might actually be part of international law that has
not ripened yet into customary international law but is possibly quite close to
doing so. Therefore, UN General Assembly resolutions and declarations, and
international tribunal advisory opinions are useful places to detect the
existence of a contested norm because the force of these documents is not
binding at inception but can become so over time.301
Examples of contested norms of international law can thus be found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is a UN General Assembly Resolution adopted in 1948.302 The UN
General Assembly does not have authority to promulgate binding international
norms; nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that several of the Universal
Declaration’s substantive rules have taken on the status of peremptory
norms.303 Indeed, the Universal Declaration created “an expectation of
adherence, and insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State
practice . . . may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding
upon the States.”304 However, other of its substantive provisions have clearly
not reached that plateau and are more aptly described as contested norms. For
example, Article 12 protects the right to privacy, but this right is not accepted
as universally binding, as many nations do not subscribe to its substantive
essence.305 Similarly, Article 18 allows the freedom of religion that includes
the right to change one’s religion, but this latter clause is clearly violated in
many countries of the world through provisions for the crime of apostasy.306 In
referring to either Article 12 or Article 18 as persuasive authority within the
context of constitutional analysis, a court could not make the assertion that
these norms are peremptory or even settled. However, the status of these norms
as contested does not detract from their utility as persuasive authority because

301 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting a UN
Economic and Social Council resolution endorsed by the UN General Assembly).
302 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 33.
303 See id. art. 4 (prohibiting slavery); id. art. 5 (prohibiting torture).
304 Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980).
305 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 33, art. 12.
306 Id. art. 18.
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a further analysis of which countries subscribe to them and how they are
interpreted could be of immense value for the reasons adduced above.307
Lastly, emerging norms are the weakest international law rules when it
comes to their recognition and acceptance.308 Only a plurality of nations could
be said to agree with their status as international law, with a greater number of
international players acting in opposition to them.309 Their status as emerging
is an indication that these types of norms are in their Neolithic period of
development on the international scene and are thus fighting an evolutionary
battle to emerge from a proto-form of substantive rule into a more defined
shape. The fact that these norms are in their infancy on the international scene
does not mean that they are necessarily new on the domestic scene as well.
Indeed, emerging norms of international law might have long and old roots in
traditional domestic law. Thus, the fact that they are defined as “emerging” is a
connotation solely applicable to their status as international law.
Emerging norms of international law pose very interesting and vibrant
normative questions when assessing their suitability to function as persuasive
authority within the context of U.S. constitutional interpretation. Because their
foundation as international law is the weakest, it would be easy to ignore them
entirely. But engaging in judicial dialogue on emerging norms of international
law might be a very effective way for the United States to exert its influence on
the international scene and encourage other legal regimes to shape themselves
in the United States’s image. Therefore, rather than attesting a congruence
between emerging norms of international law and U.S. law, the process would
be redirected outwards where a domestic statement of presence of an
international law norm in its emerging state would provide the impetus to
create or develop that particular norm. The process, of course, could also work
in reverse where a U.S. judicial determination in the context of a constitutional
307 Interestingly, the recent UN General Assembly resolution calling for a moratorium on the death
penalty likely falls in the bundle of contested norms of international law. See G.A. Res. 62/149, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/62/149 (Feb. 26, 2008). The resolution, which passed easily (105 votes in favor, 54 against, and 29
abstentions), was the product of a coalition of European, Latin American, Oceanian, and some Sub-Saharan
African countries and was opposed by North African, Middle-Eastern (except Israel), Asian, and Caribbean
nations. Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling for
Moratorium on Death Penalty, U.N. Press Release GA/10678 (Dec. 18, 2007). The United States sided with
the latter group, and it will be very interesting to track the development of this contested norm to see if it will
influence any upcoming challenges in the realm of the Eighth Amendment in the future. Id.
308 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf, (Ger. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 46–56 (Feb. 20)
(delineating a nation’s continental shelf by the principle of equidistance was not customary international law,
because the majority of nations had not agreed to the principle).
309 See id.
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argument that an emerging norm of international law does not in fact exist
might significantly contribute to that norm’s extinction. In either circumstance,
the word of the U.S. Supreme Court would likely carry a lot of weight.
Two examples serve to illustrate the two scenarios outlined above. In 2003,
the Court in Lawrence ruled that the criminalization of adult consensual
same-sex acts was an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process clause in
part by opining that international law carried that same view.310 Within five
years, a coalition of European, Latin American, and Oceanian countries
proposed a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the end to the
criminalization of homosexual acts.311 Paradoxically, and rather astonishingly,
at the time of its introduction in the UN General Assembly, the United States
(then under the George W. Bush Administration) refused for rather muddled
reasons to sign onto the resolution, an omission quickly rectified by the Obama
Administration.312 It can be of little doubt that the emphatic statements in
Lawrence played a large part in the timing of the presentation of that UN
resolution. From the opposite angle, in 2009, the UN Human Rights Council
(the body tasked by the UN to monitor human rights around the world) passed
a resolution condemning “defamation of religion” as a serious human rights
violation.313 This resolution was widely condemned by Western countries as
being a not-so-veiled attempt by Islamic countries to clamp down on human
rights groups within their territories and as a concerted attack on freedom of
expression.314 Legal pronouncements from important judicial bodies of the
world (such as the U.S. Supreme Court) would go a long way towards
preventing this concept of “defamation of religion” from seeping into the
lexicon of international law and becoming an established norm.
The nature of the specific international law norm being consulted in the
context of constitutional interpretation is a vital component of the analysis.
Whether an international law norm is settled, contested, or emerging will play
a large part in determining the weight a court in the United States should give
310

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73, 578–79 (2003).
See U.N. Gen. Assembly Statement Affirms Rights for All, INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS &
INTERSEX ASS’N (Dec. 19, 2008), http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/1211.
312 See Neil MacFarquhar, In a First, Gay Rights are Pressed at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/world/19nations.html (describing the United States’s initial refusal to
sign the declaration); Sue Pleming, In Turnaround, U.S. Signs U.N. Gay Rights Document, REUTERS, Mar. 18,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/18/us-rights-gay-usa-idUSTRE52H5CK20090318.
313 See Laura MacInnis, U.N. Body Adopts Resolution on Religious Defamation, REUTERS, Mar. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/26/us-religion-defamation-idUSTRE52P60220090326.
314 Id.
311
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that law. Moreover, the normative considerations involved will differ
depending on whether the international law norm is settled, contested, or
emerging, and will thus profoundly affect the nature of the examination.
Because of the different treatment that should be given to international law
depending on its status, this is a deliberation that courts using this law to
interpret the U.S. Constitution should always verify in the course of their
analyses.
3. Position of the United States
The third and final filter of analysis that a court seeking to use international
law persuasively within the context of constitutional interpretation should be to
inquire into the stated position of the United States apropos the particular
international norm that the court proposes to use.315 As for the other two
factors described above, the result of this inquiry will not necessarily dictate
whether that international law should be used in this context, but will inform
the court as to how those specific norms should be utilized and what policies
are to be served by such deployment.
The nature of the contemporary state is one of disaggregation.316 This is
especially true of liberal democracies but also, albeit to a lesser extent, of more
authoritarian regimes. This means that in modern times the many different
components that make up the state act with only a modest degree of concert
and often pursue their own potentially conflicting interests and motivations.317
While some cohesion by a state is preferable, because of the myriad of
operations that a modern state engages in on a daily basis, the pursuit of
complete coordination on all government business would necessarily grind the
governmental wheels to a halt and prevent a proper functioning of institutional
bodies. Therefore, the disaggregation of the state is not only a precise
description of the state of things, but it is also somewhat normatively desirable

315 It is important to note that this inquiry is not into what the stated position of the United States is vis-àvis the case that is up before the court. The position of the United States on the case at hand will always be
easy to assess, because either the United States will be an actual litigant in the case, or, in cases of national
import, will most likely either intervene or file an amicus brief.
316 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, International Delegation and State Disaggregation, 20 CONST. POL. ECON.
323 (2009); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and
Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041 (2003).
317 Easy examples that come to mind are the conflicts that erupt between the military and the diplomatic
corps of the same nation, who seemingly are often in tension with one another as to how goals ought to be
pursued.
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if only for the pragmatic reason that disaggregation forms part of those oils that
smooth the workings of the whole system.
Because of the different governmental roles enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution, the seeds of disaggregation have been a staple of the make-up of
the U.S. government since its founding. For the purposes of using international
law as persuasive authority as an aid in constitutional interpretation, this means
that once a court determines what the stated U.S. position is on a particular
doctrine of international law, it should take note of it but not behave as if that
stated position is binding upon it. After all, the task of ultimate arbiter of
constitutional meaning in the United States rests upon the Supreme Court.318
Nevertheless, being cognizant of what the United States has stated about
particular rules of international law is important not only because of the
repercussions that could be felt as a result of the Court’s opinion, but also
because these official statements of position are worthy of informed respect
when squared with a constitutional mandate.
A very topical example can be hypothesized pertaining to the recent
controversy regarding the U.S. government’s use of waterboarding—which is
considered a form of torture319—on terrorism suspects.320 It is not far-fetched
to think that a case challenging the use of waterboarding could reach the
Supreme Court in which the United States would argue in the case that it
reserves the right to use waterboarding in limited circumstances. It is also not a
stretch of imagination to expect the Court to square the United States’s
argument with its past actions, which might include a look at pertinent
international law and the United States’s signing and ratification of binding
treaties banning all uses of torture (such as the various Geneva Conventions,
the Convention Against Torture,321 or the ICCPR) or else the United States’s
vote in favor of the nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose
various substantive provisions have matured into customary international
law.322 Here the stated position of the United States on the international norm
against torture serves as a normative behavioral beacon that would appear to be

318

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review).
Michael Isikoff, The Truth Will Out, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/2008/02/
05/the-truth-will-out.html.
320 Id.
321 G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
322 See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS 2
(2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/udhr/udhr_e.pdf; supra notes 289–91.
319
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consonant with an evolving notion of the Eighth Amendment that the use of
torture is constitutionally banned under all instances.
Although the Court has not delved into deep discussions regarding the
stated position of the United States on international law it uses to interpret the
Constitution, it has developed some narratives on the matter. The most typical
of these is to note, without much elaboration, whether an international treaty to
which it refers has been signed by the United States, and if so, whether the
United States has ratified that same authority.323 Unfortunately, in these
instances, the Court has not explained the import of its notations. In other
words, is signature without ratification a signal to the Court that it should side
with the executive against the legislative, or vice versa? Or does this mean that
because the full treaty implementation has not occurred according to
constitutional mandate, the Court should treat this as a negative view of the
substantive rules contained in the treaty? And what about a signed and ratified
treaty that the United States is not abiding by? Is that something that the Court
should rectify through interpretation of constitutional law? In some cases, the
Court has begun to give some answers to these questions.
Thus, in Roper, Justice Kennedy, in referring to Article 37 of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, noted disapprovingly: “[E]very country
in the world [had] ratified [that treaty] save for the United States and
Somalia.”324 He further surmised that none of the countries that had ratified the
treaty had “entered a reservation to the provision” that was the subject matter
of the case before the Court.325 Justice Kennedy also noted that the ICCPR
contained similar prohibitions to the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child; further, he noted that even though the United States had ratified the
ICCPR, it had specifically reserved the provision (pertaining to the execution

323 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (noting that the United States had signed and
ratified the ICCPR subject to a reservation); Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (noting that the United States had ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that even though countries maintained laws allowing for capital punishment of juvenile
offenders, they had ratified treaties prohibiting the practice, and the United States was similarly situated,
having signed but not ratified the ICCPR and American Convention on Human Rights and signed and ratified
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988) (noting the United States’s position on the same treaties found in
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Stanford).
324 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576.
325 Id.
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of juveniles) that was the subject matter of Roper.326 In underlining the stated
position of the United States on both treaties, Justice Kennedy’s point was twofold: first, that the failure to ratify was so out of sync with the rest of the world
that only a disreputable regime such as Somalia shared the United States’s
position, and second, that the Court felt perfectly free to disregard the stated
U.S. position on a particular norm of international law if it conflicted with its
understanding of the U.S. Constitution.327
Justice Scalia’s understanding of the U.S. failure to ratify one treaty and
preserve a reservation to the other treaty is unsurprisingly quite different from
Justice Kennedy’s understanding. In commenting on the Roper majority’s
acknowledgment that the United States had either not ratified or had reserved
the treaties that the majority had referenced, Justice Scalia wryly wrote that
“[u]nless the Court has added to its arsenal the power to join and ratify treaties
on behalf of the United States, I cannot see how this evidence favors, rather
than refutes, its position” regarding the constitutionality of executing
juveniles.328 He went on to note that there could not be a national consensus
against the execution of juveniles because “the Senate and the President—
those actors our Constitution empowers to enter into treaties . . . have declined
to join and ratify treaties prohibiting execution of under-18 offenders.”329
Justice Scalia’s point is superficially palatable but conveniently ignores both
the normative considerations underlying Justice Kennedy’s point as well as the
text of the reservation Justice Scalia relies upon. The reservation to the treaty
prohibiting the execution of juveniles is “subject to . . . Constitutional
constraints,”330 and unless Justice Scalia takes the view that the Senate is now
the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning, then the reservation,331 by its

326 See id. at 576. The specific reservation reads: “The United States reserves the right, subject to its
Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person . . . duly convicted under existing or
future law permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed
by persons below eighteen years of age.” ICCPR, supra note 218.
327 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–78.
328 Id. at 622–623 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
330 ICCPR, supra note 218.
331 Justice Breyer made this same point in his dissent from a denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida, a
case where the issue was whether there was a length of time between death sentence and execution that could
be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (denying petition for certiorari). Noting reservations to the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment enacted by the ratifying U.S. Senate, Justice Breyer
emphasized that “the treaty reservations say nothing about whether a particular [practice indentified in the
reservation] is ‘constitutional.’” Id. at 993. Indeed, Justice Breyer noted that the reservation, similar to the one
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text alone, subjects itself to a constitutional trump. Moreover, Justice Kennedy
implied that his notation of the U.S. position on these treaties is illustrative of
the “unusual” character of this form of punishment and not an attempt to bind
the United States to these treaties through a process of ratification via judicial
fiat.332
Whether the United States’s position regarding a specific tenet of
international law is to be adhered to or disregarded will always ultimately
hinge upon the Court’s assessment of its constitutionality. Even so, it can
nonetheless inform the analysis and thus is an important part of this equation.
Because of the inherent disaggregation of the U.S. government, sometimes the
stated positions of the United States can be in conflict. This is exemplified
when a signed treaty, signaling approval by the executive branch, is either
reserved or never ratified, demonstrating a disapproval by the legislative
branch. In all cases, the judiciary should take these expressions into account
when deciding the level of respect and persuasion to afford the substantive
rules of international law because the motivations that will be at play will
differ according to the Court’s willingness to conform to (or depart from) that
expression. In either circumstance, the Court, exhibiting its awareness of what
other parts of the U.S. government have said on such matters, can only
enhance the analysis. If that occurs, we can look forward to further judicial
discussions such as those exhibited between the majority and dissent in Roper
that will elucidate more of the Court’s thinking about the use of international
law in this context.
CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy stated in Lawrence that the Constitution is subject to the
passage of time and therefore mutates in meaning as time goes by.333 Part of
that changing meaning can be garnered by looking at external sources of law,
such as the wealthy repository of rules that is contained within international
law. Indeed, international law as persuasive authority already plays a part in
U.S. constitutional adjudication. The main criticism is that this is done in a
rather ad hoc manner with seemingly little thought expended towards finding a

identified in Roper, was self-limiting in that its import had to be “‘consistent with the . . . Constitution.’” Id.
(quoting 136 CONG. REC. 36,192–99 (1990)).
332 Justice Kennedy reiterated this point by reference to the United States’s position on the same two
treaties in Graham. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
333 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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normatively plausible methodological theory to guide its use. Because this
practice is destined to continue, it is vital to construct such a methodology.
In proposing a methodology for the use of international law within the
framework of constitutional interpretation, it is axiomatic to state that context
is everything. An analysis detached from the situation in which it exists is not
only destined to be haphazard, but also to succumb to the accusation that it is
self-serving and unpredictable. However, by delineating the circumstances
under which this activity should take place and providing dependable factors
that link naturally with the policies underlying the comparative enterprise, it is
possible to avoid the pitfalls identified by the critics. As a consequence, this
sort of use of international law will create a solid foundation to be built upon as
this endeavor moves confidently into the future.

